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ABSTRACT 
 
THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
AND THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN CFSP FROM A 
SUPRANATIONALIST OUTLOOK 
AYŞEGÜL SEZER 
M.A. in European Studies Program, Thesis, 2013 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
Keywords: Common Foreign and Security Policy, Neofunctionalism, The European 
Parliament 
 
European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was initiated formally with 
the Maastricht Treaty which came into force on 1 November 1993. Indeed, Member States’ 
endeavors to adopt a common foreign policy date back to the establishment years of the 
European Union. This thesis observes the common foreign and security policy which is an 
integral part of the European Union’s integration beginning from the establishment years of 
the Union from a neofunctionalist perspective pertaining to supranational paradigm. In this 
context, although the Member States desired the CFSP to remain as an intergovernmental 
policy area, it has acquired supranational elements as a result of changes in international 
system and spillover of the integration to the political sphere. Gradual increase in the power 
of the European Parliament in the CFSP over time is evidence to this. Especially, after the 
Lisbon Treaty was signed, parliamentary activity of the European Parliament increased in this 
field visibly.  
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ÖZET 
 
ULUSLARÜSTÜ BİR BAKIŞ AÇISI İLE AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ORTAK DIŞ VE 
GÜVENLİK POLİTİKASI VE AVRUPA PARLAMENTOSU’NUN ODGP’DAKİ 
ROLÜ 
Ayşegül SEZER 
Avrupa Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı, Tez, 2013 
Danışman: Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası, Yeni İşlevselcilik, Avrupa 
Parlamentosu 
 
Avrupa Birliği Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası (ODGP), 1 Kasım 1993’te yürürlüğe giren 
Maastricht Anlaşması ile resmi olarak başlatılmıştır. Esasında, Avrupa Birliği üye 
devletlerinin ortak bir dış politika oluşturma çabaları Avrupa Birliği’nin kuruluş yıllarına 
kadar uzanmaktadır. Bu tez, Avrupa Birliği entegrasyonun çok önemli bir parçası olan Ortak 
Dış ve Güvenlik Politikasını Birliğin kuruluş yıllarından itibaren uluslarüstü paradigmaya ait 
yeni işlevselci bir bakış açısı ile incelemektedir. Bu bağlamda, üye devletler Ortak Dış ve 
Güvenlik Politikasının hükümetlerarası bir politika alanı olarak kalmasını istenmesine 
rağmen, uluslararası sistemdeki değişimler ve entegrasyonunun siyasi alana taşması (spill 
over) sonucu uluslarüstü unsurlar kazanmıştır. Avrupa Birliği’nin uluslaraüstü kurumlarından 
biri olan Avrupa Parlamentosu’nun gücünün Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası alanında 
zaman içinde artması bunun bir kanıtıdır. Özellikle Lizbon Antlaşması imzalandıktan sonra 
Avrupa Parlamentosu’nun bu alandaki parlamenter etkinliği görülür bir biçimde artmıştır.  
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INTRODUCTION 
"Europe is an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm." 
    The Belgian Foreign Minister, Mark Eyskens 
The Belgian Foreign Minister pronounced this quotation just a few days before the Operation 
Desert Storm in Gulf War in January 1991. When Saddam Hussein did not pull his troops out 
of Kuwait until January 15 United Nations deadline, the European countries were in capable 
of responding to Iraq in a coherent manner.1  
Security and defence matters have always been significant elements of both internal and 
external politics of the states. On that account, states have established different forms of 
alliances against threats to their security. In this regard, adopting a common foreign and 
security policy for the European Union constitutes a vital part of the European integration. 
However, due to confidential nature of foreign policy matters, building a common foreign 
and security policy has always been one of the most troubled policy topics in European 
Union.2 
From a neo-functionalist point of view, European integration began at technical level which 
refers to pooling coal and steel production of France and Germany, and then integration 
spilled over whole economic sector of the European continent. As the European Union 
ensured its position on world stage as an economic power, it also required EU to be involved 
in different parts of the world mostly by exporting its political norms and values. Hence, in 
due course, the EU’s endeavors to build its CFSP mounted up gradually. Unfortunately, it 
took place in a non-democratic fashion since any supranational step in foreign policy making 
was echoed as loss of sovereignty by Member states.  However, the Lisbon Treaty introduced 
new supranational actors and instruments to CFSP, opening a new window to establish 
foreign relations of the EU. Besides these novelties, Lisbon Treaty also strengthened the 
European Parliament’s position in conducting CFSP by introducing several mechanisms vis-
à-vis other institutions of the Union.  
                                                          
1http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/25/world/war-in-the-gulf-europe-gulf-fighting-shatters-
europeans-fragile-unity.html 
2Meltem Müftüler-Baç (2007)."The European Union and 2nd Pillar Integration: The Common 
Foreign and Security Policy", In The State of the European Integration, Yannis A. Stivachtis, 
(ed.), London: Ashgate Press. p.3 
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In this context, it is crucial to understand the development of the common foreign and 
security policy of the EU in order to analyze the challenges to its evolution for becoming 
supranational machinery within the EU polity. In following section, a theoretical framework 
will be presented for the thesis.  
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Chapter 1. Theoretical Framework of the Thesis 
Introduction 
Efforts to theorize European integration has begun as a sub-field under the theories of 
international relations.3 Especially, the debates on European integration have been carried out 
within a framework of supranationalist vs. intergovernmentalist logic. Until 1980s onwards, 
intellectuals had endeavored to explain how and why the European integration takes place.4 
Early years of the integration process was dominated by neo-functionalist explanations till the 
end of the 1960s. Later on, intergovernmentalism prevailed over the neo-functionalism, 
offering a new point of view in approaching to the changing set of relations both within the 
European Community and in international circles. 
Neo-functionalism assumes the European integration as a gradual process transmitting the 
competencies from national states to institutions above them. In this context, they expect 
cooperation to start at a lower level and to continue increasingly until reaching the highest 
level. In respect to this, concept of ‘spill over’ is introduced to literature of European 
integration as a neo-functionalist premise which will be dealt in detail in following part.  
On the other hand, intergovernmentalism focused on the primacy of the nation states and 
their role in shaping the integration process of the European Community. According to this 
logic, Intergovernmental bargaining and international treaties are the major instruments in 
exerting the powers of the states. Among the Community institutions, they value the 
supremacy of the European Council and the Council of the European Union which are based 
on rule of national representation. 
                                                          
3Thomas Diez & Richard Whitman (2001).  “Analysing European Integration, Reflecting on 
the English School: Scanerios for an Encounter”. ECSA Seventh Biennial International 
Conference, Wisconsin,  Panel: The European Union between International and World 
Society, p.1 
Mark A. Pollack (2000). “ International Relations Theory and European Integration”.  Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advance Studies, EUI Working Papers, European University Institute, 
p.1 
Dimitris N. Chryssochoou (2001). Theorizing European Integration, SAGE Publications, 
p.51 
4Thomas Diez & Antje Wiener (2004). European Integration Theory. Oxford University 
Press, p. 7. 
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In this chapter, neo-functionalism will be elaborated to draw a theoretical framework for the 
thesis. Initially, ‘intellectual background’5 of neo-functionalism will be introduced including 
the idea of ‘functionalism’ by Mitrany and ‘federalism’ by Spinelli. Then, the concept of spill 
over by Ernst Haas will be examined with two distinct types of it evolving from ‘functional 
spill over’ to ‘political spill over’. In the last part of the chapter, it will be looked into how 
neo-functionalism can also be used in theorizing the common foreign and security policy of 
the European Union. It also becomes an evident of Haas thesis offering that cooperation at 
sectorial level will evolve into a political domain in time.  Before dealing with neo-
functionalism, it is helpful to purport main points of the intergovernmetalism shortly in order 
to comprehend the key differences between two.  
1.1.  Intergovernmentalism 
In 1965, when France under the rule of Charles De Gaulle rejected to changes to the 
Common Agricultural Policy6 by opposing to increasing competencies of the European 
Commission and use of majority voting7, French Ministers boycotted the Council meetings 
for five months. This paralysis of community relations later is called as ‘empty chair crisis’ 
and could be solved by ‘Luxembourg Compromise’ which constituted a starting point for the 
proponents of intergovernmentalism in representing the limitations of supranationalism (or 
neo-functionalism).  
Contrary to neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism highlights the key role of the nation 
states in European integration process. One of the intergovernmentalist scholars, Alan 
Milward states that in the process of European integration, national governments remained as 
the primary actors even increased their power in the process of European integration because 
delegation of their sovereignty in some policy areas was in member states’ interest.8 
Stanley Hoffman was the initiator of the intergovernmentalist theory as a counter argument to 
neo-functionalism and constructed it mostly on realist premises. Hoffman also places the 
nation states in the center of his argument and looks integration possible where the nation 
                                                          
5 Ian Bache, Stephen George, and Simon Bulmer (2011).  Politics in the European Union. 
Third edition, New York: Oxford, p.4 
6 Meltem Müftüler Baç-Damla Cihangir (2012). “European Integration and Transatlantic 
Relations”  Transworld, Working Paper 05 
7 Anthony L. Teasdale (1993). “The Life and Death of the Luxembourg Compromise”. 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, no. 4, pp.567-579 
8 Alan S. Milward (2000). The European rescue of the nation-state, 2nd Edition, London and 
New York: Routledge. pp.2-3 
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states may pursue their national interests. Furthermore, even if the integration takes place, it 
is highly fragile in such an anarchical international order: “For it shows that the movement 
can fail not only when there is a surge of nationalism in one important part, but also when 
there are differences in assessments of the national interest that rule out agreement on the 
shape and on the world role of the new, supranational whole.”9 
According to Hoffman, if the integration achieved among the national states at low politics, it 
is unlikely to continue on high politics since the integration takes place for the sake of 
domestic forces such as better national economy or issue of accountability to its 
constituents.10 
In 1990s, based on the Hoffman’s study, Andrew Moravcsik introduced liberal 
intergovernmentalism to the literature. He explains the main premises of liberal 
intergovernmentalism as three essential elements: “the assumption of rational state behavior, 
a liberal theory of national preference formation, and an intergovernmemntalist analysis of 
interstate negotiation.”11 He bases his argument on the assumption of state rationality 
proposing that the states formulate their national preference in accordance with the ‘costs and 
benefits of economic interdependence’ and act accordingly.  
Contrary to Hoffman, Moravcsik acknowledges the role of interest groups in the process of 
integration through a bargaining between the pressure groups and the national government on 
the formation of national preferences. He employs two level game of Robert Putnam, 
constituting an analogy for the relationship between the domestic politics and international 
affairs of a national state.12 Starting from this point of view, Moravcsik explains that the 
European integration is likely to happen when the intergovernmental bargaining resulted in 
successful mediation of national preferences of member states which are determined in 
advance in accordance with the domestic pressures. Hence, he casts a very limited role for 
supranational actors in integration process. For him, supranational actors can only come to 
question when the member states are “likely to accept pooling and delegation as a means to 
                                                          
9 Stanley Hoffman (1966). “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case 
of Western Europe”.  Daedalus, Vol. 95, No. 3, Tradition and Change, p.867 
10 Ibid. pp. 909-910 
11 Andrew Moravcsik (1993).  “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A 
Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach”. Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 31, 
No:4, p.480. 
12 Ben Rosamond (2000). Theories of European Integration, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
p.136 
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assure that other governments will accept agreed legislation and enforcement to signal their 
own credibility, or to look in future decisions against domestic opposition.”13 
1.2.  Functionalism 
David Mitrany was a scholar who witnessed the Second World War and the failure of the 
League of Nations. That has a strong impact upon his system of ideas making them strongly 
opposed to nationalism. Although he was not a European integration theorist, his concept of 
functionalism had become pioneer of the integration theories. 
Mitrany argues the necessity of creating ‘a working peace system’ to prevent wars.14 He 
further suggests that neither broad international organizations (such United Nations) nor 
federalist projects brings the ‘working peace system’ since such formations still exist with 
their ‘national’ constraints hampering them to act together.15 However, ‘human needs’ 
transcend the national boundaries and reach individuals, and connect them under a common, 
natural governor.16 Relevant to this issue, he states that “The truth is that by its very nature 
the constitutional approach emphasizes the individual index of power; the functional 
approach emphasizes the common index of need. There are many such needs which cut 
across national boundaries, and an effective beginning could be made by providing joint 
government for them.”17 
Mitrany proposed the establishment of separate international agencies functioning in order to 
serve for and have authority over specific needs of human. For this purpose, governments 
have to leave their authorities regarding these technical areas to the new functional agency. 
He suggests that such functional agencies may be established first at regional level than it 
will extend to wider areas of which people are also in need of, eventually leading to creation 
of a functional worldwide system.  
Mitrany exemplifies such systems as railways organized on a continental basis; shipping 
organized on an intercontinental basis; aviation organized on a universal basis.18 It is clear 
                                                          
13 Andrew Moravcsik (1998). The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from 
Messina to Maastricht. UCL Press: UK, pp.8-9 
14David Mitrany (1966). A working peace system, Quandrangle Books, p.93 
15 David Mitrany (1948). “The Functional Approach to World Organization, International 
Affairs”. Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944. Vol. 24, No. 3, p.351. 
16 Ibid. p.356 
17 Ibid. 
18 David Mitrany (1966). A working peace system.  pp.106-107 
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that Mitrany’s proposal to establish functional agencies would also make states further 
dependent to each other for their day-to-day works and make difficult to break the 
cooperation ensured among them.  
1.3.  Federalism 
Altiero Spinelli was a theorist and politician who fought against fascist Italian nationalism 
since his early ages. He was the leading figure of ‘The European Union of Federalist’ group 
which derived from war-time resistance groups.19 His ideas evolved from communism to 
federalism over the sixteen years he spent in jail and confinement.  
In 1941, while Spinelli was a still political prisoner on the island Ventotene, he and his 
colleague Ernesto Rossi drew up Ventotene Manifesto requiring a new kind of polity for the 
European continent, excluding any kind privileges among the European citizens.20 In the 
Manifestation, ensuring the European Unity and reform of society are emphasized as the 
post-war duties required for a Federal Europe.  
In ALDE (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe) background notes, European 
Federalism is defined as “a political movement which seeks to pool the exercise of Member 
States’ sovereignty as a basis for the foundation of supranational authorities. Specifically, it is 
concerned with implementing projects or resolving supranational issues by means of 
transnational policies.”21 Starting from this point of view, it must be certainly remarked that 
federalism by Spinelli is designed utterly in a political framework contrary to Mitrany’s 
technocratic functionalism.  
“Whereas Mitrany aimed explicitly to depoliticize the process of the transfer of power away 
from national governments, federalists sought a clear transfer of political authority.”22 As he 
stated thoroughly the Ventotene Manifestation, “rational organization of the United States of 
Europe, which can only be based on republican constitution of the federate[s] countries” can 
only be achieved by leaving old system constituted on the nation states. Furthermore, Spinelli 
points out the creation of a European armed service replacing national armies of the European 
                                                          
19 Retrieved from  http://www.spinelligroup.eu/altiero-spinelli/ 
20 Retrieved from  http://www.altierospinelli.org/manifesto/en/manifesto1944en_en.html  
21 Retrieved from  http://www.alde.eu/fileadmin/2010_site-
docs/documents/background_notes/EN/FT_ALDE_Federalism.pdf  
22 Ian Bache, Stephen George, and Simon Bulmer (2011). Politics in the European Union. 
Third edition, New York: Oxford, p.6 
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countries and the administration of this army will be laid down in the hands of the Federal 
European state.  
The fact that he focused on ‘citizens of Europe’ and ‘democracy’ as the starting points of the 
reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War shows that ‘federalism’ which Spinelli 
envisaged offers a top to down integration in Europe beginning from political sphere 
extending to other fields of life. That is reason why he calls the men and women of Europe to 
take action and propagandize “a moment for a free and united Europe”.23 
1.4.  Neofunctionalism 
In 1960s, Ernst Haas pioneered the neo-functionalist theory with a soft critique of Mitrany’s 
functionalism as remaining highly technocratic. He basically tries to find an answer to: 
“[...] how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, 
merge and mix with their neighbors so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while 
acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves.”24 
He, along with his followers, Philippe Schmitter and Leon Lindberg, developed the concept 
of ‘spill over’ based on a differentiation between ‘low politics’ and ‘high politics’. They 
suggest that the integration of common interests in low politics is much more likely to happen 
than in high politics and once the integration is succeeded at low politics, it will ‘spill over’ to 
high political sphere through time. Lindberg defines ‘spill over’ as “In its most general 
formulation, ‘spillover’ refers to a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, 
creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, 
which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth.”25 
According to Schmitter, some conditions are required to realize spill over: “(1) increased 
interdependence between member states, (2) a crisis of a certain size, (3) development of a 
                                                          
23 Ventotene Manifestation, 1941Retrieved from  
http://www.altierospinelli.org/manifesto/en/manifesto1944en_en.html,  
24 E. B. Haas (1970). “The Study of Regional Integration: reflections on the joy and anguish 
of pre-theorizing”. International Organization. 24(4). p.610 
25 L. Lindberg (1963). The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press; London: Oxford University Press. 
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powerful regional bureaucracy, (4) development of independent, regional interest 
organizations capable of acting in the region.”26 
Scholars advocating the neo-functionalist theory discussed two kinds of spill over: 
‘functional spill over’ and ‘political spill over’.27 ‘Functional spill over’ refers to a process of 
sector integration starting with low profile economic and technical sectors and gradually 
expanding to all sectors of the economy.28 On the other hand, ‘Political spill over’ refers “the 
incremental shifting of expectations, the changing of values and the coalescing at the 
supranational level of national interest groups and political parties in response to sectoral 
integration.”29 According to this logic, once one of the sectors in economy is integrated, 
‘interest groups’ in this sector and the related sectors will push for further integration in other 
sectors. Such continuum in incremental integrative relations in economy reaches also political 
sphere demanding parties (integrating member states) to leave their sovereign rights (at least 
a part of it) to the supranational authority which would be established to govern the new 
integrated sector. This new supranational authority is the output of the political spill over 
which is subsequent to the functional spill over.  
Therefore, this new type of ‘functionalism’ proposed by Ernst Haas was not a depoliticized 
one as Mitrany suggests; on the contrary it aims at the end of the process to establish a 
supranational political structure above the national governments. In this regard, following 
quotation shows both Haas’ definition of political integration and his approach how it should 
be ensured: 
“Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national 
settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities to a new 
centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. 
The result is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.”30 
Haas expects the political integration would take place upon the demand of the various 
interest groups within the society who are motivated by some sort of economic determinism.  
                                                          
26Philippe Schmitter (2005). “Ernst B. Haas and the legacy of neofunctionalism”.  Journal of 
European Public Policy. p.258 
27 A.-M. Burley & W. Mattli (1993). “Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal 
Integration”. International Organization, 47 (1). 41-76, p. 55. 
28 E. B. Haas (1958). The Uniting of Europe. Stanford University Press. p. 297. 
29 A.-M. Burley & W. Mattli (1993). p. 55. 
30 Ernst B. Haas (1958). The Uniting for Europe, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957. 
Stanford University Press. 
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In this context, he states that “The ‘good Europeans’ are not the main creators of the regional 
community that is growing up; the process of community formation is dominated by 
nationally constituted groups with specific interests and aims, willing and able to adjust their 
aspirations by turning to supranational means when this course appears profitable.”31 
Contrary to the federalists, Haas does not envisage a process of political integration 
intentionally initiated by the people who already purposed to create a federal system. On the 
contrary, he recognizes the distinct characteristics of individuals and groups such as their 
nationalities. However, he prioritized the needs of the individuals as their common interests 
making them connected on a common ground. Therefore, he introduces a rational point of 
view for the creation of the supranational authority. 
Taking into consideration of the inception of the European Union, it is seen that Robert 
Schuman and Jean Monnet worked within a neo-functionalist framework to unite Europe. 
Jean Monnet, the head of the General Planning Commission of France, was the original 
author of what has become known as Schuman Plan establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) which would later on start the Common Market. German supply of coal 
and French supply of steel were pooled under a single umbrella enabling two countries to 
control each other’s production. In this way, France and Germany became economically more 
interdependent to each other in terms of using two strategically important raw materials. This 
solution also regulated the Franco-German relations in a positive direction by hampering 
another war in Europe.  In 1951, the High Authority of the ECSC was established under the 
presidency of Jean Monnet as the executive body of the Community. It was a supranational 
institution which was subjected to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. In 1967, 
the High Authority was merged into the European Commission. 
As Haas theorized, the High Authority of the ECSC emerged as a supranational institution as 
a product of integration on an economic ground. First the integration started in a single 
sector, namely coal and steel, and then it extended to whole European economy in the form of 
European Economic Community. In due course, integration in economic sphere spilled over 
the political level further transforming itself to the European Union in a geographically 
enlarged form.  
                                                          
31Ernst B. Haas (1966). The Uniting for Europe, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957. 
Stanford University Press, second edition, 1966, xxxiii quoted in Moravcsik (2005). “The 
European Constitutional Compromise and the neofunctionalist legacy”. Journal of European 
Public Policy. 12:2. p.352 
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1.5.  Why Neofunctionalism Fits into Thesis? 
Neo-functionalism is the theoretical framework of this thesis because, the neo-functionalist 
explanation of ‘actor’ and ‘spill over’ properly manifests how the integration and the 
parliamentary participation have progressed in common foreign and security policy of the 
European Union, which was initiated as an intergovernmental project at first, and then 
evolved into a quasi-supranational policy domain.  
Neo-functionalism recognizes the role of the whole sub- and supranational actors in the 
system, where as the intergovernmentalism disregards the ones other than the national states. 
Smith emphasizes the limitation of looking into only actions of the member states by stating 
that: “[…] major events such as Intergovernmental Conferences usually only codify existing 
arrangements; they rarely lead to major innovations.”32 However, neo-functionalism enables 
to observe other bodies included in the process such as the European Commission, 
parliamentary committees of the European Parliament and other interparliamentary groups 
within the European Parliament and the international organizations, interest groups acting 
both at European level and at national level and even the public opinion among the European 
citizens. In other words, it provides a broader perspective to look into the trends of the 
participation of the European Parliament in common foreign and security policy of the 
European Union not only from the ‘major events’ leaded by the member states but also from 
the ‘socialization processes’ of the  officials and the states through the new institutions of the 
Union. When the Lisbon Treaty introduced the European External Action Service as the 
leading body of the common foreign and security policy of the Union, it was a historic 
moment in terms of bringing the CFSP on supranational level. Because EEAS, with its vast 
staff 60 per cent of which are permanent and all of them are appointed on merit rather than 
national origin, constituted ‘the Brussels-based machinery’ which controls the role of the EU 
in the world.33 Furthermore, EEAS together with the High representative is accountable to 
the European Parliament since the Parliament approves their budget and appoints the High 
Representative. Therefore, intergovernmentalist theories fail to recognize the role of EEAS 
and High representative in external relations of the Union, whereas the neo-functionalism 
locates them as the credible actors of the European integration process.   
                                                          
32 Micheal E. Smith (2004). “Institutions and Foreign Policy Cooperation: the theoretical and 
empirical terrain”. In Europe’s Foreign Policy, The Institutionalization of Cooperation. 
Cambridge University Press: UK, p.34. 
33 Helene Sjursen (2011). “ Not so intergovernmental after all? On democracy and integration 
in European Foreign and Security Policy”. Journal of European Public Policy. 18:8. p.1084. 
12 
 
Neo-functional concept of spillover also explains how the ‘functional and political spill over’ 
has been taking place in common foreign and security policy by pulling it supranational 
ground gradually. In terms of economic sector, member states had already integrated their 
external trade mechanisms with third countries within the framework of the single market. 
Regarding the security and defence policy, it can be argued that when Cold War ended and 
crisis arose in Yugoslavia, the need to take a joint action against the uncertainties emerged in 
international sphere and the threat coming from Eastern Europe pushed member states to 
integrate their national foreign and defence policies under a common roof. Firstly, member 
states initiated the integration on military sector. Initially, they used existing defence 
structures such as Western European Union, later it was incorporated into the European 
Union structure when the Member States decided to pool their troops and military 
ammunitions to use effectively in the case of a necessity. What is important in here is that the 
changes in the international system gave birth of the need to pool the Member States’ military 
resources. What was missing when Pleven suggested creating a European Army in 1950 was 
this need because the NATO was enough to meet the European defence requirements. Once 
such a need emerged after the end of Cold War, Member States took action to cooperate in 
military sector initiating the functional spill over. In due course, as the European Union 
emerged as a global player on international scene, particularly as a civilian power, political 
spill over arose at European institutional level by the virtue of the need to take joint actions 
and positions in the case of international crisis in different parts of the world. Therefore, the 
Member States delegated some of their competences to the Council to establish ‘common 
strategies’, develop ‘common positions’ and ‘joint actions’ on behalf of them. Later on, they 
allowed supranational institutions of the Union such as the Commission and the Parliament to 
participate in common foreign and security policy of the Union through several institutional 
mechanisms which will be dealt in following chapters.  
Founded on these factors, throughout the thesis, the role of the European Parliament in 
common foreign and security policy of the European Union will be observed from a 
supranationalist outlook, particularly in accordance with the premises of the neo-functionalist 
theory explained above. Additionally, it is expected to be seen that empirical findings prove 
that the degree of the involvement of the European Parliament as a supranational actor in 
common foreign and security policy would increase after the Lisbon Treaty drafted in 2007.  
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Chapter 2. Evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
In this chapter, evolution of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) from 1950 to 
2007 will be observed. For this purpose, Treaties establishing and functioning the EU; 
intergovernmental conferences, meetings and their documents; plans, perspectives, reports of 
the eminent figures of the Europe are the major sources setting light to the stages of this 
gradual evolution.  
Foreign policy has been the hardest area where the Member States harmonize their policies 
and actions because it is assumed as domaine réservé of the nation states. Therefore, CFSP 
was tried to be kept at intergovernmental level under the control of the Member States. 
However, growing number of integrated policy areas pushed Member States for adopting a 
common European foreign policy. In addition, systemic changes such as the end of the Cold 
War and the 9/11 terrorist attacks on USA brought about the need to pool Member States’ 
resources in order to encounter the new challenges and uncertainties of the international 
system. From a neo-functionalist perspective, intergovernmental mechanisms leading the 
EU’s CFSP will eventually transform their functions to the supranational bodies in time. In 
this chapter, it will be examined how the CFSP attained a place for itself in the institutional 
set-up of the EU in a historical sequence. In the following chapter, how the European 
Parliament as a supranational actor gained ground on the CFSP will be dealt.  
2.1.  From  European Defense Community to European Political Cooperation 
In 1950, René Pleven, who was the Prime Minister of France, proposed the establishment of a 
unified European army as an integral part of the European Defense Community. In his 
famous Pleven Plan, he stated that “The associated nations have recognized the need to 
defend the Atlantic community against any possible aggression, on a line situated as far to the 
East as possible. They have agreed that all those forces, irrespective of their nationality, 
should the placed under the command of a single Commander-in-Chief.” Proposed European 
army would not be a mere grouping of national military units, but would be commanded by 
supranational institutions settled in Strasbourg. Also the European army would be financed 
from a common budget established jointly by Member states. In that way such a defense 
formation would not only be a joint project of national governments, it would also be ‘the 
common’ defense instrument of the western European.  
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Whereas some scholars claim that the EDC was only a tool of the US Foreign policy which 
would be resorted when it is needed,34 idea of EDC and a unified European army emerged 
and evolved as an alternative to Atlanticist defense system, namely NATO. During the Cold 
War years Western Europe took its position on the side of the US, therefore security of 
Western Europe was already been protected under the umbrella of NATO. However, when 
Western Germany was also invited to join to NATO, France concerns over domination of 
USA on the European continent increased so, France declared that a European common 
defense mechanism should be set up in order for protecting themselves from Soviet threat. 
Therefore as an alternative to Atlanticist defense system, Pleven suggested creating a Europe-
centered security and defense policy which includes France, West Germany, Italy, and 
Benelux. For that aim, a draft treaty was signed in 1952 for the establishment of the EDC but 
ironically the draft treaty was rejected by the French parliament in 1954.  
Similarly, in 1952 the European Political Community, which aimed to combine the ECSC 
and the EDC under a common roof, was proposed to set up and a draft treaty was prepared by 
the ECSC assembly. Nevertheless the idea of the EPC was also slumped with the rejection of 
the ratification of the EDC treaty by the French Parliament in 1954. There were several 
reasons behind this rejection. The most apparent two were the Gaullist concerns that the EDC 
caused loss of France’s national sovereignty and possibility of a German re-militarization. 
Also, absence of the Great Britain and the questions on how to manage the relations between 
the EDC and NATO prevented most of the French parliamentarians to vote in favor of the 
EDC Treaty. Consequently, rejection of EDC Treaty by French Parliament geared down the 
integration of the European Community on foreign policy and retarded the initiation of a 
common European foreign and security policy decades later.  
Subsequent to these two failures, to revitalize the European integration, six European 
countries came together in Messina conference. Though the Messina conference did not aim 
at establishing a common European foreign policy,  it is important in the sense that paving 
the way to the establishment of the common market which makes the European countries 
more and more interdependent to each other.  
                                                          
34M.Türker Arı. “European Defense Community in the US Foreign Policy Context”. p.84, 
retrieved from http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/6.-TurkerAri.pdf 
15 
 
Unfortunately, ideas concerning the creation of a common European defense policy were 
postponed because of the six governments’ wary approaches towards a common foreign 
policy until the Fouchet Plans come to the scene. 
In 1961, Charles de Gaulle proposed the first Fouchet plans drafted by his Foreign Minister 
Christian Fouchet. Initially, the plan proposed arrangements on formulation of a common 
foreign and defense policy; in 1962 it was revised in accordance with the French national 
interests.35 Since de Gaulle was bothered with increasingly supranational course of affairs of 
the European Economic Community and the American influence on the security of the 
European continent, he intended to call the Six to establish closer political cooperation for the 
foreign relations on an intergovernmental basis. He clearly expresses that Europe needs to be 
integrated in itself and France would be leading power of it: 
“France can survive only in the first rank of nations . . . and nothing in life was more 
important than working toward this goal. This is what we were aiming for in the vast arena of 
Europe. . . . My policy aimed at the setting up of a concert of European States, which in 
developing all sorts of ties between them would increase their independence and solidarity. . . 
. There was every reason to believe that the process of evolution might lead to their 
confederation. . . . In practice this led us to put the European Economic Community into 
effect; to encourage the Six to concert together regularly in political matters; to prevent 
certain others, in particular Great Britain, from dragging the West into an Atlantic system . . . 
totally incompatible with a European Europe. . . . [Germany] would have an essential role to 
play within the Economic Community and, should it ever materialize, in the political concert 
of the Six. . . . I intended that France should weave a network of preferential ties with 
Germany.”36 
 The six were incapable of reaching a consensus on the Fouchet Plan due to the concerns on 
that the plan would prejudice the independent and supranational nature of the Community 
bodies and the proposed common defense provisions of the Fouchet plan were in conflict 
with the ones of the NATO.37 Therefore, the Fouchet Plan failed because of the national 
aspirations of France aiming to ensure its position in communitarian affairs of Europe.    
Member States reiterated their will to cooperate on a common European foreign policy in 
Hague Summit in December 1969 so in 1970, the “Davignon Report” was drafted at the 
                                                          
35 Andrew Moravcsik (2000). “De Gaulle Between Grain and Grandeur: The Political 
Economy of French EC Policy: 1958-1970.” Journal of Cold War Studies. 2.2. p.34 
36 Charles de Gaulle, Memoires d’espoir, Vol. 1, pp. 181–182. quoted in Ibid. P.26 
37 CVCE, 11.09.2012, Fouchet Plans, retrieved from 
http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1997/10/13/c7c2b3f9-cf51-4a8e-874a-
d6c3eda5125a/publishable_en.pdf 
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Luxembourg Summit. This report offers the alternative mechanism for regular exchange of 
information and seeks progress in coordination and unification of policies on foreign affairs. 
In this context, Davignon report, which was a loose version of the Fouchet plan, prepared the 
ground for the establishment of the “European Political Cooperation”. 
Nevertheless, the documents produced at the end of all these efforts to adopt a common 
European foreign and defense policy were legally non-binding on the Member States until the 
Single European Act was concluded in 1987 when the EPC was mentioned in a legal 
document.38 
EPC was a solely intergovernmental design which envisaged the meeting of the foreign 
ministers of the member states at least two times a year in order for discussing the major 
international issues. Bodies of the European Community such as the Commission and the 
European Parliament were excluded from this context and Security and defense issues were 
omitted.39 Establishment of a common foreign security and defense policy were voiced in a 
series of reports and summits were take place until the conclusion of the SEA. First of them 
was the first “Foreign Ministers Conference on Political Union” which was held in Munich in 
1970. Mr. Walter Scheel, German Foreign Minister, chaired the meeting. In a press release, 
he said that “a new process has begun (…) for an effective ‘system of cooperation’ to come 
about a real ‘political will’ on the part of the Governments to align their points of view on 
concrete problems would be required (…).”40 In Munich Conference of Foreign Ministers, 
major international crisis such as the situation in the Middle East were dealt along with the 
issues concerning cooperation in Europe on security matters i.e. plans for the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).41 
In November 1973, a report which aims at changing the functioning of the EPC was 
concluded in Copenhagen Summit. Copenhagen Report concluded that a body of “European 
correspondents” would establish on the purpose of improving the consultation between the 
                                                          
38Elfriede Regelsberger (1997). “Institutional Set up and Functioning of EPC/CFSP”.  In 
Foreignpolicy of the European Union: from EPC to CFSP and beyond. Elfriede 
Regelsberger/Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent/Wolfgang Wessels (eds.). London pp. 67-
84. 
39Wolfgang Wessels & Jürgen Mittag (2002). “The Parliamentary Dimension of CFSP/ESDP 
Options for the European Convention”. Study submitted for the European Parliament, Final 
Report. p.61 
40 Bulletin of European Communities, No. 1-1971, retrieved from 
http://aei.pitt.edu/4548/1/4548.pdf 
41 Ibid.  
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Member States. As another positive development, the number of the Foreign Ministers’ 
meetings and the sessions of the Political Committee were decided to be increased.  
Despite the further efforts to adopt a common foreign policy in Paris Summit of 1974 such as 
the report published by Leo Tindemans stating that a single European attitude towards the 
international matters is significant for the good of the Union, the Ten were failed to take a 
visible position concerning Islamic revolution in Iran and the occupation of Afghanistan by 
the Soviet Union.42 
In 1981, London report calls for a more coherent and politically strong EPC on the 
international and security matters. For that aim, some procedural arrangements were applied 
such as the creation of the troika system, enhancement of the coordination between the 
presidencies and the inclusion of the commission to the foreign affairs of the community. 
Moreover the London report also introduced the “crisis mechanism” which offers a 
conference of the political committee or of the Council could be gathered within 48 hours 
upon the request of at least three member states.43 
In 1983, Solemn Declaration on European Union aimed at more coordination between EPC 
and EC through using several instruments such as sanctions, trade and development aid.44 
This declaration granted a power to the European parliament via the presentation of a report 
to the EP of each European Council presidency.  
All of these above mentioned developments, meetings, reports, declarations from 1950 to 
1987 contributed to the European integration at different levels. However the idea of foreign 
policy coordination apparently has always been among the consideration but it proceeded 
very slowly with serious obstacles on the way. Because the Member states were driven 
mostly by nationalist concerns, they reckoned that once they cooperate on external relations, 
they will lose an integral part of their sovereign rights. 
 
                                                          
42 Bulletin of the European Communities. Supplement 1/76. Text of Mr. Leo Tindemans’ 
letter to his European Council colleagues sent on 29 December 1975, retrieved from 
http://aei.pitt.edu/942/1/political_tindemans_report.pdf 
43 Bulletin of the European Communities. Supplement 3. Luxembourg Report on European 
Political Cooperation (London, 13 October 1981) retrieved from 
http://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/2002/1/18/869a63a6-4c28-4e42-8c41-
efd2415cd7dc/publishable_en.pdf 
44Wolfgang Wessels & Jürgen Mittag (2002). p.64 
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2.2.  From Single European Act to Maastricht Treaty 
An adhoc committee on institutional questions was established before the Intergovernmental 
Conference of the SEA and suggested to establishment of a ‘Permanent Secretariat’ in order 
to enable further cooperation on security and defence matters. Unfortunately, the Member 
States resisted establishing further cooperation on foreign policy as it was the case during the 
negotiations of Solemn Declaration. 
When the Single European Act concluded in 1987, all prior intergovernmental efforts put in a 
legal document which is binding on all the Member states. Title 3, Article 30 of the SEA puts 
the provisions relating to the European cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy. Article 30 
consists of twelve provisions emphasizing the importance of convergence of Member States’ 
positions, desirability of the common actions, and the consistency between the external 
policies of the European Community and the decisions of the European Political Cooperation. 
SEA bunched together the issues raised during the meetings and summits prior to IGC 
leading to SEA so it included variety of topics on foreign policy matters ranging from the 
number of the meetings of the Foreign Affairs Minister and the political committee to the 
political and economic aspects of security. Also, Article 6 SEA underlined that “Nothing in 
this Title shall impede closer cooperation in the field of security between certain of the High 
Contracting Parties within the framework of the Western European Union or the Atlantic 
Alliances.”45 In this sense, it is guaranteed that any action taken on behalf of the European 
Community would not prejudice the promises given to the WEU and NATO.  
The end of the Cold War signifies a turning point for the European integration because it 
brings important systemic changes to the European continent. Reunification of Germany and 
transformation in the Central and Eastern European Countries marked a new course of affairs 
for the European Community. This was also a chance for deepening and widening the 
European integration in terms of building a common European foreign policy as Müftüler-
Baç states “The breakthrough for the European common foreign policy came at the end of the 
Cold War with the systemic transformation caused by the demolition of the bipolar balance of 
power institutions. One could easily argue that the end of Cold War provided the European 
states with a collective interest: to deal with the emerging uncertainty.” The decision of the 
G24 summit in Paris 198946 proposing that the European Commission would coordinate the 
                                                          
45 Single European Act, Article 30(6)(c)  
46Wolfgang Wessels & Jürgen Mittag (2002). p.65. 
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financial aids for CEEC also proves that the uncertainty coming with the end of the Cold War 
brought new responsibilities to Europe requiring the Member States to act jointly in their 
foreign affairs. 
The Maastricht Treaty was born in such a fluctuant international atmosphere and brought a 
new institutional design by creating the pillar structure within a single institutional 
framework. Although the EPC was replaced with the Common Foreign and Security policy 
devoting a large section in the Treaty, the CFSP was excluded from the community method 
by incorporating it into a separate second pillar. Both the systemic changes in international 
relations and the motivation among the Member States to adopt a common European foreign 
policy made eminent figures of the Member States to believe in the functionality of the 
Maastricht Treaty as cited: 
“We're not just here to make a single market, but a political union.”47 
     Jacques Delors, EU Commission President, 1993 
 
“The European Union Treaty... within a few years will lead to the creation of 
what the founding fathers of modern Europe dreamed of after the war, the 
United States of Europe.”48 
 Helmut Kohl, German Chancellor, 1992
  
 
Although the CFSP remained outside the community method by placing it in a separate 
second pillar, Maastricht Treaty enabled to take the CFSP decisions from a more European 
perspective instead of leaving them all to the Foreign Ministries of the National governments. 
The Maastricht Treaty introduced a new ‘Permanent Secretariat’ under the Secretariat of the 
Council. Besides the role of the Committee of Permanent Representatives in CFSP, new 
Permanent Secretariat with its permanent staff consisting of officials and diplomats from 
Member States attached a European element to foreign policy of the Community. Regarding 
that, Duke states that “The merging of the EPC/CFSP Secretariat with the Council 
counterpart not only strengthened  the meagresecreterial support that had existed hitherto, but 
provided Professional staff who could ensure continuity between different chairs, master 
dossiers and provide intimate knowledge of the procedures.”49  
                                                          
47 Retrieved from http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSTREAT/TR3.htm 
48 Chris Shore (2000). Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European 
Integration.Routledge. p.211 
49 Simon Duke & Sophie Vanhoonacker (2006). “Administrative Governance in the CFSP: 
Development and Practices”. European Foreign Affairs Review.  p.170. 
20 
 
On the other hand, Maastricht Treaty includes an inconsistency in terms of introducing 
‘single institutional framework’ and ‘the pillar structure’ at the same time. Therefore, Duke 
expresses this conflicting situation by saying that “with the advent of the CFSP and the 
‘single institutional framework’ the artificial distinction between Community and CFSP 
matters became even more problematic and the Commission was not only ‘fully associated’ 
with the CFSP, but began to play a critical role in helping the ensure consistency in the 
overall external relations of the Union.”50 Also, Müftüler-Baç draws attention to the 
Commission’s key role in CFSP by pointing out that “The most important tools that the EU 
had for achieving its objectives under the CFSP are the trade agreements, financial aid 
packages, association agreements and enlargement. It is through these tools that the 
Commission was mostly involved in the CFSP. [...] The nature of these tools also 
demonstrates that the greatest strength of the EU lies in its civilian power character, rather 
than hard power. That is because the EU relies on economic measures and incentives to 
realize its foreign policy objectives. As a result of the civilian nature of the foreign policy 
tools, the Commission comes to play an important role under the CFSP.”51 
Besides, Western European Union is addressed in Maastricht Treaty as a “sub-contracted 
party” to the issues concerning the defense matters. By this way ‘Petersberg Tasks’ became 
available for the European Union’s external policies since the Petersberg Declaration was 
adopted in WEU Ministerial Meeting in Bonn in 1992. Another procedural innovation 
introduced by the Maastricht is that application of the qualified majority voting for 
implementation measures. Also the commission was given the right to initiate a specific 
policy action concertedly with the Council meaning that DG IA, Commissioner created for 
External Political Affairs and the Committee of Permanent Representatives can directly 
involve to Policy making process.52 
Furthermore, common positions (Article J.2) and joint actions (Article J.3) were introduced 
as new instruments for the CFSP. These novel mechanisms provided an impetus for the 
European Community to act jointly and more coherently. 
                                                          
50 Ibid. 
51 Meltem Müftüler Baç (2007). p.8 
52 Wolfgang Wessel & Jürgen Mittag (2002). p.67 
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As first test cases of the ability of member states to act as a one within framework of the 
CFSP introduced in the Maastricht Treaty, Bosnian War and Yugoslav Crisis marked that 
such ability has not exist in practice yet.  
2.3.  Amsterdam Treaty 
Amsterdam Treaty did not change the status quo so much in CFSP remained as a separate 
policy area outside the community method. European Council kept CFSP decision making in 
its hands maintaining the intergovernmental nature.  
Since the CFSP failed in terms its operationality in the Western Balkans crisis, Amsterdam 
Treaty aimed at bringing some improvements to the CFSP.53 The new Treaty introduced 
“common strategies” as a novel instrument in CFSP.54 In addition to the aforementioned 
instruments introduced by Maastricht Treaty, namely joint actions and common positions; 
“common strategies” outline the objectives of the common foreign and security policies 
whose main principles are decided by the Council and the Member States.55 
Additionally, Amsterdam Treaty introduced the ‘constructive abstention’ as a new 
mechanism easing to take a decision in common foreign and security policies.56 Constructive 
abstention is similar to a kind of opt-out from a joint action or a common position providing 
any Member State to abstain from participating a particular common action. Article J.13 of 
the Amsterdam Treaty states that “When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council 
may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph.”57 
However, it continues as “In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall 
accept that the decision commits the Union.” warning the absent Member States should not 
be contrarian with the related decision of the Council. ‘Mutual solidarity’ among the 
members is emphasized expecting an abstaining member to act in its international affairs in 
accordance with the CFSP decisions taken in the council. Furthermore, if more than one third 
of the members of the Council abstain in their vote, the council cannot take a decision.  
Operational capacity of the CFSP is aimed to be enhanced by the making the Peterberg Tasks 
available for the European Union’s external policies by amending Article J.3 paragraph 1. 
                                                          
53Wolfgang Wessel & Jürgen Mittag (2002). p.70. 
54 Amsterdam Treaty, ART J.2 
55 Ibid. ART J.3 
56 Ibid. ART J.13 
57 Ibid.  
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With this amendment, European Council’s power to define the principles of and general 
guidelines for the common foreign and security policy extended to the matters having 
defence implications.58 Petersberg Tasks include humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
peacekeeping tasks and tasks involving combat forces in crisis management, including 
peacemaking.59 Another important point brought with the Amsterdam Treaty is that the 
possibility of the integration of the WEU into the European Community, if the European 
Council so decides.60 Although this proposal was rejected by the United Kingdom and 
Denmark61, by giving such a perspective Amsterdam Treaty brought new discussions on 
military dimension of the Union. Hence, the European Council showed its willingness to 
establishment of a common European defence policy, if the Member States decides so jointly.  
Last but the most important innovation Amsterdam Treaty introduced is the High 
Representative for the common foreign and security policy62 in order to assist the Council by 
preparing and implementing political decisions.63 High representative was established for the 
purpose of making the CFSP more visible and coherent through linking the functions of both 
the Secretary General of the Council and the Presidency concerning the CFSP issues. 
Therefore as it is stated in the Treaty High Representative is vested with representing the 
Presidency in international matters if the Presidency decides so.64 
2.4. European Security and Defence Policy comes to the Scene: From St. Malo to 
 Nice Treaty 
In two years between the St. Malo Summit and the Treaty of Nice, CFSP and the European 
Security and Defense Policy developed much more rapidly than first forty years of the 
evolution of the CFSP. In bilateral meetings, numerous European Councils, Foreign 
Ministers’ meetings, great number of documents were concluded concerning the role of the 
EU as a relevant and coherent actor in international sphere. In this sense, during this two 
years period of time, Member States frankly showed their intention to transform the EU into a 
                                                          
58 Ibid. ART J.3 (1) 
59 Fabrizio Pagani (1998). “A New Gear in the CFSP Machinery: Integration of the 
Petersberg Tasks in the Treaty on European Union”. European Journal of International Law. 
 9(4), p.738. 
60 Ibid. ART J.7 
61Wolfgang Wessel & Jürgen Mittag (2002). p.72. 
62 Ibid. ART J.8 (3) 
63 Ibid. ART J.16 
64 Ibid. ART J8, J16, 39, Art. 121 
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visible player which has a military wing. Hence, the documents they created includes mostly 
the points referring to increase EU’s operational capacity which is envisaged in the 
Petersberg tasks and to set up administrative units which would effectively monitor and 
control the operations in related fields.  
Two factors were decisive in experiencing such quick developments in both the CFSP and the 
ESDP: the first one is the government change in the United Kingdom in 1997 and the second 
is the Kosovo Crisis in which the US dominated the field operations.  
Tony Blair’s accession to the power in Britain eased to find a common ground to take the 
necessary steps concerning the CFSP of the EU at the EU level. He was not opposed to 
engage in defense and security issues at the EU level contrary to his conservative 
predecessor. Britain’s long lasting defense preference on the side of Atlanticism and concerns 
delegating its national sovereignty to a supranational body hindered the development of a 
tangible CFSP until this change in government in Britain. In 1998, Tony Blair, the Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom between 1997 and 2007 stated that “[The European Union] 
must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the 
means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in response to international crises.”65 
EU’s inability to act jointly and in a timely manner in Kosovo Crisis constituted the second 
factor fastened the further developments in the CFSP/ESDP. Member States once again faced 
the fact that United States is the dominant military power in the West and the European 
Union still is a ‘military worm’. Therefore in St.Malo Summit between UK and France, they 
agreed that “the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the 
means to decide to us them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international 
crisis without prejudice to actions by NATO.”66 
Therefore, these two factors were the major forces to transform the CFSP/ESDP evolution 
process into a faster phase. Franco-British St. Malo Joint Declaration constituted the political 
ground for the establishment of European military capabilities in 1998. British and French 
political commitment turned into concrete policy actions with decision taken in the 
intergovernmental European Council Meetings. At Cologne European Council on 3-4 June 
                                                          
65 Leo Michel, NATO, the European Union, and the United States: Why not a virtuous 
ménage à trois? Retrieved from http://www.acus.org/files/ISP/michel_eucomib.pdf on 1 
January 2012 
66Joint Declaration of the British-French Summit at St. Malo, 4 December 1998, Source: EU 
Institute for Security Studies (ISS-EU) 
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1999, a declaration on “Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and 
Defence” is published by the Members of the Union. This declaration also initiated the 
operative dimension of the ESDP which was politically introduced in the Amsterdam Treaty 
in the framework of the Western European Union. In this sense, the Cologne European 
Council Declaration calls that “In pursuit of our Common Foreign and Security Policy 
objectives and the progressive framing of a common defence policy, we are convinced that 
the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full range of conflict prevention 
and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union, the “Petersberg 
tasks”. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by 
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to 
respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO. The EU will thereby 
increase its ability to contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the 
principles of the UN Charter.”67 Several institutional questions are addressed in the Council 
Declaration such as establishment of “regular (or ad hoc) meetings of the General Affairs 
Council, as appropriate including Defence Ministers; a permanent body in Brussels (Political 
and Security Committee) consisting of representatives with pol/mil expertise; an EU Military 
Committee consisting of Military Representatives making recommendations to the Political 
and Security Committee; a EU Military Staff including a Situation Centre; and providing 
other resources such as a Satellite Centre, Institute for Security Studies.”68 
Besides the issues concerning the decision making and the principles of the ESDP included in 
the declaration, points relating to the implementation and modalities of participation and 
cooperation are also included in the text. In this context it is suggested that the EU-led 
operations should be grouped as being “EU-led operations using NATO assets and 
capabilities or EU-led operations without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.” 
Concerning the operations requiring the recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, Berlin 
decisions of 1996 and the Washington NATO summit decisions of April 1999 are addressed 
to be taken into consideration during the implementation of the necessary arrangements.69 
Another development in ESDP was the Headline Goals introduced in Helsinki European 
Council. Headline Goals aimed at increasing the military capabilities of the EU as it is 
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envisioned in the Petesberg tasks. In Presidency report on Helsinki European Council on 
“Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence” Headline Goals are 
elaborated as “by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy 
rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the 
Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 
brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the 
necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support 
services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be 
able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid 
response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to 
sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of 
deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the 
initial forces.”70 So, a “Rapid Reaction Force (RRF)” of the EU was anticipated by this 
article in the Presidency Report of Helsinki, being a corner stone for the establishment of 
independent EU missions in different parts of the world. After concluding the Headline 
Goals, Council decided to set up new institutions for the proper functioning of the envisioned 
Rapid Reaction Forces. Therefore, a military committee71, a military staff72, and a standing 
Political and Security Committee (PSC)73 would be the new coordination center for the 
ESDP. 
On the 28th February 2000, in Sintra, The Defence Ministers of the European Community met 
informally. Decisions taken in the Helsinki European Council were reassessed and the 
progress in terms of the implementation of the necessary means for the European Security 
and Defense Policy. In this meeting ministers reviewed the steps taken during the Portuguese 
Presidency and the future arrangements planned in the Helsinki summit. So they decided that 
preconcerted bodies which are the European Military Committee and European Military 
Major Staff may start to operate in the Council Building (Justus Lipsius), in Brussels.74 
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In Feira European Council in June 2000, civil aspect of the Headline Goals was formulated. 
Also, modalities of consultation and participation were arranged to allow the non-EU 
European NATO Members and other countries which are candidates or accession to the EU 
to contribute to EU military crisis management.75 Principles and coordination/consultation 
mechanism on military issues and developing modalities for EU/NATO relations were 
discussed and decided in Feira European Council. Concrete targets for police were also set in 
the Annex 4 of the Council conclusions.  
Nice European Council, in December 2000, led to the conclusion of the Nice Treaty which 
includes sum of the documents produced in prior Council meetings, summits and bilateral 
meetings concerning the ESDP and CFSP. Moreover, the Nice Treaty eliminated the role 
given to Western European Union by the Amsterdam Treaty and incorporated the bodies of 
the WEU into the EU’s structure. Article 17 of the Nice Treaty authorized the EU to 
formulate the common foreign and security policy concerning the defense aspects, bypassing 
the WEU. Also, Nice Summit defined the development of military capabilities and the 
strengthening of civil crisis management capabilities in the light of the Headline Goals and of 
the military capability goals established in Helsinki.76 
Another important breakthrough made in the Nice European Council is to establish the legal 
basis for the creation of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) with the Article 25 TEU. 
Thus, the PSC is in charge of the implementation of the CFSP and ESDP.77 According to the 
Article 25 TEU, PSC is entitled to “monitor the international situation in the areas covered by 
the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by 
delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative and 
monitor the implementation of agreed policies and exercise, under the responsibility of the 
Council, political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations.”78 At Nice 
European Council, it is also decided that permanent bodies79 such as Political and Security 
Committee, Military Committee of the European Union and the Military Staff of the 
European Union are to start working and their functions are also included in a separate annex 
to the Nice Presidency Report.   
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Another major development Treaty of Nice introduced is “enhanced cooperation”. Enhanced 
cooperation existed before the Nice Treaty under the name of ‘closer cooperation’ but it was 
not applicable to the second pillar. Nice Treaty enabled to use enhanced cooperation in 
common foreign and security policy. Article 43 TEU reads that enhanced cooperation 
requires at least 8 countries willing to cooperate closely on a common the conduct of a joint 
action or the implementation of a common position. Nevertheless, a veto by any national 
government was still possible in CFSP matters, despite it was had been eliminated from first 
and third pillar.80 
Regarding the developments from 1998 to 2000, Member States of the European Union 
posed enthusiasm to establish military wing of the EU. Hence, the European Security and 
Defence Policy was adopted as an integral part of the common foreign and security policy of 
the EU. As a result of the increasing insecurity in Western Balkans because of the political 
turmoil, all actors of the Union convinced to adopt a military aspect to CFSP. At the eve of 
the Nice Treaty, High Representative Solana expressed his opinions:  “We must make the 
best use of all the resources at our disposal. Collectively these are substantial: as the world’s 
largest aid donor we already make an important financial contribution to aid programmes and 
to humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. We have a global diplomatic network more 
than twice as big as that of the US State Department. We can use our diplomatic, economic 
and financial muscle to influence the behaviour of recalcitrant parties and aggressors. But 
until now we have been unable to add military means to the measures available. This is now 
changing. Our aim is to integrate our military forces into a global crisis management 
strategy.” (September 28, 2000) 
2.5.  Lisbon Treaty 
The Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing 
the European Community, known as the Lisbon Treaty was concluded at the end of a 
considerably long period of time from 2001 to 2009 as a consequence of disinclination of the 
Member States of. Lisbon Treaty brought structural and procedural changes to the CFSP and 
the ESDP as well as to the other institutions of the EU. The Lisbon Treaty introduced a new 
separate chapter entitled “Provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy” which 
                                                          
80 Mathias JOPP (2003). “CFSP decision making and procedures for enhanced cooperation” 
seminar on “Capacity and Actor Building: Which instruments and institutions does the EU 
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incorporates all progress concerning the ESDP into the Treaty format. In the new section 2, 
Article 28 A reads that “The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of 
the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational 
capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions 
outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international 
security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of 
these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.”  
Unanimity remained principle in deciding issues concerning the security and defense matters. 
However, some degree of flexibility introduced for the budget of the CFSP. Article 28 calls 
the Council to “adopt a decision establishing the specific procedures for guaranteeing rapid 
access to appropriations in the Union budget for urgent financing of initiatives in the 
framework of the common foreign and security policy, and in particular for preparatory 
activities for the tasks referred to in Article 28 A(1) and Article 28 B. It shall act after 
consulting the European Parliament.” This treaty provision enabled rapid access to Union 
Budget. On the other hand, there are some tasks referred to in Article 28 A(1) and Article 28 
B which are not charged to the Union budget such as “expenditures arising from operations 
having military or defense implications”. For such tasks, Lisbon treaty introduced the ‘start 
up funds’ which is composed of the contributions of the Member states in accordance with 
the gross national product scale. Decisions relating to the start up funds are taken by the 
Council by a qualified majority, on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. These decisions shall include “the procedures for setting 
up and financing the start up fund, in particular the amount allocated to the fund; the 
procedures administering the start-up fund; the financial control procedures.” 
Lisbon Treaty also merged two different posts which are in charge of conducting the foreign 
affairs of the Union. Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and the High Representative are 
incorporated under the post of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
New double-hatted High Representative would serve both as a Vice-President of the 
European Commission and the head of the European External Action Service. In 2007, 
Valéry Giscard d'Estaing appriciated the creation of new High Representative by expressing 
that  “The creation of a High Representative for foreign policy [...] would be a big change 
compared with the current situation. It would put an end to the double job which exists 
between the current function of Mr. Javier Solana, and that carried out within the 
Commission by Mme Benita Ferrero-Waldner [...]. One and the same person would therefore 
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deal with problems and respond to the famous telephone calls of Henry Kissinger: I want to 
speak to Europe.” 
Article 13 A paragraph 3 of the Lisbon Treaty sets the provision for the establishment of the 
European External Action as a unit supporting the High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy. According to the Article 13 A “This service shall work in cooperation 
with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant 
departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff 
seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States. The organisation and 
functioning of the European External Action Service shall be established by a decision of the 
Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting 
the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission.” Establishing 
the EEAS is important because it is a Brussels-based institution incorporating both the 
national diplomatic corps and the staff of the EU institutions under a single roof. EEAS, with 
its vast staff 60 per cent of which are permanent and all of them are appointed on merit rather 
than national origin, constituted ‘the Brussels-based machinery’ which controls the role of the 
EU in the world.81 Therefore, EEAS constituted a major step in “brusselization” of the CFSP 
transforming its intergovernmental execution in practice. 
In 9 September 2001, terrorist attacks on USA posed a new challenge to common foreign and 
security policy of the EU. To this respect, EU took additional steps to encounter “the 
systemic challenges and transformation of the post-9/11 order”.82 For this reason, in 2003 
European Security Strategy document included the terrorism, proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, organized crime, regional conflicts, and state failures as the key threats to 
the European Security.  While drafting the Lisbon Treaty, these new security risks are also 
taken into consideration. In order to provide a more secure Europe, further institutional 
developments are recorded, concerning the common defense matters.  
A European Defence Agency is referred in Article 28 A and its tasks are elaborated in Article 
28 D as follow “(a) contribute to identifying the Member States' military capability objectives 
and evaluating observance of the capability commitments given by the Member States; (b) 
promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible 
procurement methods; (c) propose multilateral projects to fulfill the objectives in terms of 
military capabilities, ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member 
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States and management of specific cooperation programmes; (d) support defence technology 
research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and the study of technical solutions 
meeting future operational needs; (e) contribute to identifying and, if necessary, 
implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological base of 
the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of military expenditure.”   
The Treaty of Lisbon also introduced a new type of cooperation mechanism which is the 
‘permanent structured cooperation’ in Article 28 A(6) and 28(E). It is stated in the Article 
28A “Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have 
made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most 
demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union 
framework.” How the permanent structured cooperation shall be administered is set in the 
Article 28 E and a separate protocol on the permanent structured cooperation. But there is a 
possibility to face problems in implementing the permanent structured cooperation because it 
may cause splits among the Member States in terms of their capabilities and responsibilities 
in the Union.  
Additionally, Lisbon Treaty introduced two new concepts which are ‘the mutual assistance 
article’ in Article 28A(7) and ‘a mutual solidarity’ in Article 188R TFEU Title VII. Mutual 
assistance clause can be interpreted as a mutual defence clause83 since it calls the Member 
States to take a stand against the aggressor party. Also related treaty provision adds that 
“Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains 
the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.” 
While the mutual assistance article concerns a Member State which is the victim of armed 
aggression on its territory, mutual solidarity clause (Title VII, article 188R TFEU) concerns a 
Member State which is the object of a terrorist attack and natural or man-made disaster. 
Hence, the Member States are called for pooling their resources by mobilizing the 
instruments of the EU in order to “prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member 
States; protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; 
assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a 
terrorist attack; and to assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political 
authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.”84 
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2.6.  Concluding Remarks 
To sum up, establishment of a common foreign and security policy for the Europe was 
always in the minds of the politicians from the very beginning of the European integration. 
While some of them advocated it, some rejected because of the sovereignty concerns. 
Nevertheless, when the changes in international system brought insecurity to the doors of 
Europe, Member States understood that to act jointly against the modern challenges is not a 
discretionary policy choice but an urgent need to protect all Europeans. Therefore, member 
states accelerated the steps to adopt a common foreign and security policy and European 
security and defence policy as an integral part of it. For this purpose, they put common 
strategies, decided common positions, published declarations and participated in joint 
military actions. As the number of the joint actions and the role of Brussels-based institutions 
increased in time, actors of the CFSP have become more “consensus-seeking”85 in their 
interactions. Hence, member states convinced to give more power to supranational actors. 
Within this context, it is safe to move on observing how the European Parliament’s powers in 
CFSP extended over time. 
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Chapter 3. How the Powers of the European Parliament Extended? 
When the 1950 Pleven Plan remained fruitless, it traced a symbolic and decisive moment 
effecting whole course of philosophy which the EU established upon. It set up a basic rule 
saying that the cooperation would not start at political level rather it would progress on a 
technical level. Therefore, distribution of power among the different institutions of the 
Community was done in accordance with this step. While the Council and the Commission 
got the lion’s share in terms of having competencies in controlling the Community affairs, 
Common Assembly established as a consultative body. However, in due course, concerns 
relating to the factors such as accountability, transparency, scrutiny prompted to enhance the 
European Parliament’s powers in various policy areas. Despite the constrained evolution of 
the CFSP, European Parliament acquired remarkable degree of power in this policy area at 
early 1970s. 
 Early Remarks 
Davignon Report in 1970 and the London Report in 1981 were concluded at the end of the 
meetings of Foreign Ministers of the member states. In order to set out a more coherent 
approach to international issues and to matters of security, reports set up a framework for the 
establishment of regular relational network among the European Parliament and the other 
institutions of the Community on the creation of a common European foreign policy sphere. 
In general term, these two reports called the President – in office of the Council to inform the 
Parliament on the main subjects of the political cooperation in foreign policy issues. 
In 1970, first Davignon Report puts that “Ministers and the members of the Political Affairs 
Committee of the European Parliament will hold six monthly meetings to discuss questions 
which are the subject of consultations in the framework of foreign policy cooperation. These 
meetings will be informal, to ensure that the parliamentarians and Ministers can express their 
views freely.”86 In 1973, number of the meetings (colloquies) increased four in the Second 
Report on European Political Cooperation in foreign policy matters. Also the Second 
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Davignon Report reiterated that “Once a year, the President-in office of the Council will 
provide the European Parliament with a progress report on the work in question.”87 
 
London Report on European Political Cooperation reaffirmed that the Luxembourg (the 
second Davignon Report) and the Copenhagen Reports brought the European Parliament to a 
position to take a visible stance on the political cooperation. It points out that the European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers achieved to establish fruitful communication 
channels such as informal meetings between the ministers and the leaders of the different 
political groups represented in Parliament and these informal meetings provide a further 
opportunity for informal exchanges on political cooperation.88 The report also adds that 
“Taking account of the need to further strengthen ties with the directly-elected Parliament, 
the Ten envisage the possibility of more frequent reference to resolutions adopted by 
Parliament in the deliberations, communiqués and declarations of the Ten, and in ministers' 
opening statements at colloquies with the Political Affairs Committee of Parliament.”89 
Another important point touched upon in the London Report is the President’s statement 
including political cooperation subjects discussed at the meeting to the Parliament after a 
meeting of the European Council.  
Until 1970s onwards the European Parliament was perceived as an only consultative body. 
With the emergence of democratic deficit debates in the European Union, the European 
Parliament received more attention within the institutional structure of the Union. After the 
first direct election took place in 1979, the European Parliament become more accountable 
and legitimate to the European citizens and institutions.  Therefore, integration in common 
foreign and security policy also started to provide a very limited role for the European 
Parliament at the beginning. In this sense, Davignon Reports and the London Report were 
among the first steps of inclusion of the EP in CFSP matters, even though it is not fully 
incorporated into this policy area.  
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3.1.  Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty 
With the institutional reforms adopted in the 1980s, increasingly the European Parliament 
began to acquire some recognition in terms of its involvement in the foreign policy vision for 
the European Community. It was the first time that the Single European Act of 1986 brought 
the name of the European Parliament into a treaty provision concerning the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy of the EU. Article 30(4) of the SEA reads that “The High Contracting 
Parties shall ensure that the European Parliament is closely associated with European 
Political Co-operation. To that end the Presidency shall regularly inform the European 
Parliament of the foreign policy issues which are being examined within the framework of 
Political Co-operation and shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly 
taken into consideration.” This provision burdened the European Council with responsibility 
to inform the European Parliament on the issues concerning the CFSP. However the phrase 
‘duly’ remains notably tacit in the sense of defining the exact duties of the European Council 
before the European Parliament.  
Prior to the Intergovernmental Conference leading to the SEA, a committee established in the 
European Parliament in order to address the institutional questions.90 The committee 
suggested number of proposals to establish better cooperation on security issues and to set-up 
a permanent secretariat to regulate the relations between the Council and the Parliament on 
foreign policy matters. Unfortunately, the SEA did not codify the EP’s role in CFSP as 
comprehensively as the proposal of the committee.91 
Before the Maastricht Treaty concluded the European Parliament issued a number of 
resolutions on the EP’s competencies on CFSP matters. In 25th October 1991, in its 
resolution, the EP demanded a veto right in the case of military actions. It was believed that 
such a veto would enhance the “essential joint interest” of the Union achieving cooperation 
between the European Council and the European Parliament in monitoring and promoting the 
CFSP.92 Furthermore, the EP proposed the inclusion of the Western European Union and its 
institutions into the structure of the EU which can be achieved with Nice Treaty in 2000, after 
17 years later the EP resolution.93  
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In Maastricht Treaty competences of the Parliament redefined in the Article J.7 based on the 
Article 30(4) of the SEA: “The Presidency shall consult the European Parliament on the main 
aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure that 
the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. The European 
Parliament shall be kept regularly informed by the Presidency and the Commission of the 
development of the Union's foreign and security policy. The European Parliament may ask 
questions of the Councils or make recommendations to it. It shall hold an annual debate on 
progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy.” This provision offered 
the Parliament right to be consulted, ask questions and make recommendations to the Council 
on the CFSP matters. Even though it seems that the EP acquired new competencies on 
controlling the CFSP, it is a question mark whether it uses them efficiently.  Firstly, 
concerning the consultation competency of the EP, the treaty provision is ambiguously 
framed.  What the ‘main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security 
policy’ are not elaborated enough on which points the EP would be got involved in 
controlling the CFSP. According to Dehousse as far as the large-scale orientations are 
concerned, it is the Council presenting the ‘main aspects and the basic choices of the common 
foreign and security policy’.94 Also, this Article does not provide the European Parliament 
with a prior consultation mechanism.95 The EP Resolution on the results of 
intergovernmental conferences leading to the Maastricht Treaty draws the attention to the 
shortcomings associated with the pillar structure of the EU introduced with the Maastricht 
and criticizes exclusion of the common foreign and security policy from the first pillar since 
it hinders implementation of co-decision procedure requiring both the EP and the Council 
would have equal power in making a legislative act.96 Dehousse adds that the decision 
making mechanism remained unchanged as in the SEA.97 Although the Treaty enables to use 
qualified majority voting, as long as it is unanimously agreed beforehand in the Council. On 
the other hand, Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton claim that the Member States agreed in the 
Treaty of Maastricht to change the provisions of the EC treaty in order to require 
Parliament’s assent for all important agreements. These were defined as any agreement 
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having a specific institutional framework …”98 Nevertheless, referred international 
agreements generally fall under the first pillar of the EU which is not the jurisdiction of the 
CFSP.  
According to Thomas Grunert, “In October 1993 the Council decided to reduce the gap 
between the EP’s demands and the (Maastricht) treaty provisions by a decision on guidelines 
in the CFSP field. In addition to the existing arrangements, the presidency will attribute the 
utmost importance to the obligation to inform, in concert with the Commission, and consult 
Parliament, as provided for in Article J.7 (TEU). The presidency and the Commission will 
acquit themselves on these tasks as regularly as possible and in a manner compatible with the 
sensitive nature of certain information and discussions. The presidency will be in constant 
contact with Parliament in arenas covered by CFSP.” In order to achieve this aim, following 
instruments: “By attending, in addition to the two colloquia, whenever this is useful or 
necessary, the meetings of Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence 
Policy; by participating, if need be, in Parliament’s debates in plenary session; by continuing 
the practice of the general-secretariat of the Council attending the start of each meeting of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, security and Defence Policy; by having recourse to the 
practice of written information.”99 
The Maastricht Treaty also introduced that “The European Parliament may ask questions of 
the Council or make recommendations to it.”100 On the basis of this article, each and every 
member of the European parliament has the right to pose questions to the Council in the form 
of the written and oral interpellation. Although the EP’s recommendations are not binding on 
the Council’s decision, they do generate political pressure on the Council.  
Budgetary provisions were concluded in Article J.11 of the Maastricht Treaty proposing that 
the administrative expenditures of the actions referred under the title shall be charged to the 
budget of the European Communities. Also, the Council may decide unanimously whether 
the operational expenditure is charged to the budget of the European Communities or to the 
member states, where appropriate in accordance with a scale to be decided.101 If the Council 
decides the nature of the expenditure is an administrative or operational but requiring 
financing from EC budget, normal budgetary procedure laid down in the Treaty establishing 
                                                          
98Corbett, Jacobs and Shackleton (Eds.) (2004). The European Parliament, 5th ed. (London), 
p. 203 
99T.Grunert op. cit. p.115 quoted in Wolfgang Wessel & Jürgen Mittag (2002).  
100 Art 21 of the Maastricht Treaty 
101ART. J.11 of the Maastricht Treaty 
37 
 
the European Community shall be applicable.102 Once it is decided that expenditure is 
charged to the EC budget, approval of the Parliament becomes obligatory to pass the 
expenditure. Hence the European Parliament finds a way to have the last word on CFSP 
matters as a means of insisting on its own preferences on certain points of the action at stake. 
Jörg Monar criticizes this budgetary system “blurring of responsibilities of’ the institutions 
and lacking of a coherent link between political and budgetary responsibility in 
implementation.”103 
While the Single European Act provided the European Parliament with only information 
power, the Maastricht Treaty addressed the key concerns in democratizing the common 
foreign and security policy of the European Union. Thus, the Maastricht Treaty provided the 
European Parliament with the budgetary powers in a limited sense along with the right to ask 
question and right to be consulted. Within this context, it can be argued that Maastricht 
Treaty laid the foundation of the most of the European Parliament’s competencies on CFSP, 
which the EP has today.  
 
3.2. Amsterdam treaty 
The institutional reforms that followed in later years tried to remedy what the Maastricht 
Treaty left unaddressed. The Maastricht Treaty created an obscure situation by making the 
European Parliament a budgetary authority “considering itself to be competent to judge on 
the use of the expenditures and the freezing of credits while the Council, the diplomatic 
authority, considers this Community interference in the intergovernmental second pillar to be 
superfluous.”104 Therefore, some Member of the Parliaments prepared reports and introduced 
them before the intergovernmental conference leading to Treaty on European Union took 
place.105In these reports, European parliament demanded a more integrated foreign policy in 
line with the Community culture. For this purpose, it is proposed that role of the 
supranational institutions such as the Parliament and the Commission on CFSP should be 
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enhanced, whole budget of the CFSP should be financed from the Community budget, 
qualified majority decisions should increase in the second pillar and WEU should be 
incorporated into the EU.106 
These demands were partially met in the Treaty of Amsterdam.107 With respect to the 
qualified majority voting decisions, Article J.13 lists two situations in which the Council may 
act by qualified majority: “(1) When adopting joint actions, common positions or taking any 
other decision on the basis of a common strategy; (2) When adopting any decision 
implementing a joint action or a common position.”108 Nevertheless, in Amsterdam Treaty no 
mechanism introduced in order to prevent the Council to take a decision calling Council to 
act unanimously. Moreover, the decisions having military and or defense implications were 
excluded from the jurisdiction of the Article J.13.109  
 
Article J.18 of the Amsterdam Treaty introduced new budgetary provisions with minor 
changes to the Maastricht Treaty. According to the paragraph 2 and 3, all of the 
administrative expenditures and operational expenditures with the exception of the ones 
having military or defence implications shall be charged to the budget of the European 
Communities. As a co-player in approving the budget, European Parliament increased its 
participation in decision making process of the CFSP with the extension of use of the 
Community budget in financing CFSP. The increased control of the EP on the Community 
budget on security emerged as an important gain for democratic control of Community 
foreign policy. 
The Amsterdam Treaty became a significant step in increasing the European Parliament’s 
participation in CFSP through budgetary affairs. By extending use of Community budget in 
financing the most of the CFSP actions, it opened a window for the Parliament to participate 
in CFSP matters. Amsterdam Treaty also extended the use of qualified majority decision in 
certain actions. Although this change does not directly relate to the competencies of the 
European Parliament, it is very significant in the sense that democratizing the CFSP decision 
making. Moreover, it was one of the proposals of the European Parliament offering the 
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extension of QMV on other aspects of the CFSP so it is also good to see that the proposals of 
the EP are taken into consideration by the member states and reflected to the Treaties.  
 
3.3.  Nice Treaty  
One of the most important novelties introduced by the Nice Treaty is the initiation of the 
European Security and Defence Policy formally as a result of incorporation of the WEU 
organs into the EU. This is already seen in the Maastricht Treaty but the Nice Treaty took a 
more concrete step into operationalizing the concrete steps to be taken to realize this larger 
goal. Therefore, a number of permanent military bodies such as Political Security Committee 
(PSC), Military Committee (MC), Military Staff (MS), and Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) 
emerged as a part of the CFSP. But the only institution incorporated into the treaty context 
was the Political Security Committee. These new institutions other than the PSC remained 
outside the jurisdiction and oversight of the formal and informal powers of the EP because 
they were excluded from the treaty.110 Consequently, ESDP, one of the vital components of 
the CFSP, remained out of reach of the Parliament. Wagner proposes that “While the EP has 
established itself as an actor in foreign and security policy, ESDP has remained aloof from 
the EP’s involvement. Article 21 of the Treaty of Nice obliges the presidency to consult the 
EP ‘on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy’ 
[…] It does not even mention ESDP explicitly.”111 Also in 2005, a group of MEPs led by 
Elmar Brok “recommended that joint costs for military operations in the framework of the 
European Security and Defence Policy should come from the Community budget, doing 
away with the current Member States' subsidiary budgets. This should also be the case for 
any future ESDP operations in the fight against terrorism.”112 There were also MEPs against 
to establishment of ESDP i.e. in 2003 Geoffrey van Orden stated that “[ESDP] wastes already 
meagre continental European defence budgets on EU structures that mirror proven NATO 
institutions.” 
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“Enhanced cooperation” was another mechanism introduced in the treaty of Nice and created 
a loophole for the member states to flee their joint action from budgetary supervision of the 
European Parliament. Article 44a of the Nice treaty reads that “Expenditure resulting from 
implementation of enhanced cooperation, other than administrative costs entailed for the 
institutions, shall be borne by the participating Member States, unless all members of the 
Council, acting unanimously after consulting the European Parliament, decide otherwise.” 
Operational expenditures which do not have military aspect and defence implications are to 
be charged to the budget of the European Community but if these operational expenditures 
are done under category of enhanced cooperation, member states can charge these 
expenditures to their own budget to flee from parliamentary supervision over spending. In 
European Parliament’s resolution on the Nice Treaty and the future of the European Union, 
Parliament stated its discomfort with making use of enhanced cooperation in order to practice 
intergovernmental method under the second pillar and the use of veto by a Member State.113 
On the other hand, while the Parliament appreciated the enhanced cooperation because it 
blocks a national veto in itself, it criticizes that common strategies and defence policy are 
excluded from the scope of it.114 
Unfortunately, prior powers of the EP, i.e. information, consultation, recommendation and 
ask questions remained untouched in the Nice Treaty as it was the case in the treaty of 
Amsterdam. Since the endeavors to increase parliament’s role in CFSP making failed in 
turning into real treaty provision at the end of the intergovernmental conferences, European 
Union institutions were obliged to conclude inter-institutional agreements in order to 
maintain more effective and less complex institutional affairs in conducting the CFSP. These 
inter-institutional agreements will be dealt in the fourth chapter. 
Considering the subsequent treaty amendments and the accession of the ten new member 
states to the European Union, debates on a new Constitutional Treaty for Europe flawed 
among the member states. The new constitutional Treaty is expected to improve democracy, 
transparency and efficiency in European Union while bringing an international visibility to 
the Union. The Treaty for the Establishment of a Constitution in Europe referred as the 
Constitutional Treaty was signed on 29 October 2004, and the ratification process had started. 
Although the Constitutional Treaty did not aim to create ‘a super European state’ above the 
member states, this remained as the major concern of the member states. Consequently, the 
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Constitutional Treaty was rejected in both French and Dutch Referendums in 2005. Until 
2007 when Germany took over the rotating presidency, ‘a period reflection’ was experienced. 
During the German Presidency a new impetus has given to the works for a new Treaty and in 
December 2007 new treaty was signed in Lisbon. This time, Irish electorates rejected the 
Lisbon Treaty in 2008 but it reversed in 2009 referendum as a result of annexing additional 
protocols to the Lisbon Treaty. Hence, the Lisbon Treaty entered into force with a few 
amendments to its first draft as German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated “the fundamentals 
of the Constitution have been maintained in large part.” Now, we can move on the Lisbon 
Treaty and its implications for the European Parliament relating to common foreign and 
security policy. 
 
3.4.  Lisbon Treaty 
In 2007, Intergovernmental conference in Lisbon opened for negotiating on a European 
Reform Treaty where the European Parliament’s representatives (Elmar Brok, Enrique Barón 
Crespo and Andrew Duff) also attended to the discussions. In 20 February 2008, the EP 
approved the Treaty based on the analysis of the Lisbon Treaty’s impacts by the EP’s 
rapportuers Richard Corbett and Inigo Mendez de Vigo. In his speech Corbett expressed that 
the Lisbon Treat will make the EU more democratic: “[…] EU legislation must pass a double 
democratic check: acceptability to elected governments in the Council of ministers and 
acceptability to the directly elected MEPs in the European Parliament – the only case of an 
international structure with such a degree of accountability.”115 In his opinion on Lisbon 
Treaty, Andrew Duff stated that “with respect to the external action of the Union, the Treaty 
of Lisbon makes major structural alterations in comparison with the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe (2004) by separating Title V of the Treaty on European Union – 
containing general provisions on the Union’s external action, specific provisions on common 
foreign and security policy (CFSP) and provisions concerning common security and defence 
policy (ESDP) – from Part Five of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – 
containing general provisions on the Union’s external action, common commercial policy, 
cooperation with third countries and humanitarian aid, restrictive measures, international 
agreements, relations with international organisations and third countries and EU delegations, 
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and the solidarity clause.”116 As a result, the members of the European Parliament showed 
great eagerness to conclude the Lisbon Treaty in order to make the EU more democratic, 
transparent and efficient.  
When the Lisbon Treaty entered into effect in 2009 upon the ratifications in the national 
parliaments of the EU members, it brought about a number of novelties to the EU, 
specifically concerning the role of the EP. Although one of the declarations attached to the 
Lisbon Treaty ‘Declaration concerning the common foreign and security policy’ states that 
“the provisions covering the Common Foreign and Security Policy do not give new powers to 
the Commission to initiate decisions nor do they increase the role of the European 
Parliament”, reforms the new Treaty brought effected the role of the Parliament in CFSP 
visibly.117 On the other hand, commenting on the Lisbon Treaty in his statement to the 
European Parliament, Jerzy Buzek, one of the former presidents of the European Parliament 
stated, “The Lisbon Treaty enables Europe to take its responsibilities in the world more 
seriously. [...] Our European Parliament committees and permanent delegations will take 
responsibility for a Common EU Energy Policy both internally and externally based on 
sustainability and solidarity. [...] I am proud to say that we now have a set of democratic and 
efficient rules capable for providing answers for almost 500 million people, in 27 Member 
States.”118 
A High Representative of the Union Foreign Affairs and Security Policy created as a post 
combining three functions; the a Vice-President of the Commission, the President of the 
Foreign Affairs Council and Council’s representative for the CFSP. The European 
Parliament’s consent is required to appointment whole commission. Therefore as being a vice 
president of the Commission, High Representative is responsible to the EP getting its vote of 
consent to the entire Commission. Article 17 (7) TEU states that “Taking into account the 
elections to the European Parliament and after having held the appropriate consultations, the 
European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a 
candidate for President of the Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the European 
Parliament by a majority of its component members. If he does not obtain the required 
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majority, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall within one month 
propose a new candidate who shall be elected by the European Parliament following the same 
procedure.” Besides the Article 17 TEU, Article 201 of the TFEU elaborates the use of 
motion of censure by the parliament; ‘If the motion of censure is carried by a two-thirds 
majority of the votes cast, representing a majority of the component members of the 
European Parliament, the members of the Commission shall resign as a body and the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall resign from duties 
that he or she carries out in the Commission...’. As the Treaty provisions put forward, the 
European Parliament has now considerable influence over the new post of High 
Representative. Moreover, high representative’s responsibility to the Parliament increased 
with the Article 21 TEU assigning her to “consult the European Parliament on the main 
aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common 
security and defence policy and inform how those policies evolve and ensure that the views 
of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration”. Another progress on the 
parliamentary scrutiny over the CFSP matters was the increase in the number of the debates 
held by the high representative in the parliament from one to two in a year (Article 21 (b) 
TEU). Thus, the EP provided a more effective channel to be informed on CFSP via High 
Representative who is the head of the newly established European External Action Service. 
European External Action Service was established on the basis of the Article 27(3) TEU 
which authorizes the Council to take the decision after consulting the European Parliament 
and after obtaining the consent of the Commission.  
The budget of newly created European External Action Service is financed from the budget 
of the High Representative (as being a Vice-President of the Commission) and approval of its 
budget is bound with the procedures of the Community budget.  Therefore, this provided a 
new scrutiny area to the European Parliament by being a player in the financial procedure of 
the EEAS and having a say in the appointment of its staff and conducting its missions.  
In 20 October 2009, European Parliament approved a report prepared by Rapporteur MEP 
Elmar Brok on the institutional aspects of setting up the European External Action Service. In 
this report, European Parliament clearly stated its expectation from the EEAS and the other 
related institutions to be taken into consideration within the framework of the treaty 
provisions: “Taking into account the fact that the European Parliament will be consulted on 
the setting-up of the EEAS, and given the budgetary consequences, believes that an early and 
substantive dialogue with Parliament is essential for the effective start-up of the EEAS and to 
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ensure that it receives the necessary financial resources.”119 By this way, the European 
parliament enhanced its position in accordance to the pre-Lisbon period in terms of acquiring 
more interinstitutional bargaining power via the establishment of the EEAS.120 Especially 
budgetary control of the EEAS by the Parliament assured parliaments role more than ever.121 
 
Nevertheless article 41 (3) TEU brought a negative influence on the budgetary powers of the 
EP by introducing “Rapid Access to appropriations in the Union budget for urgent financing 
of initiatives” which refers especially to the civil and/or military operations and missions (Art 
41 (3) TEU).These funds are named after “start-up fund” consisting of Member States’ 
contributions. The European parliament which normally fully participates in the budgetary 
procedure, shall only be consulted.122 
The European Council is formally introduced in the Lisbon Treaty with its new post “the 
president of the European Council” in Article 9(A) and (B). Apart from the six-month 
rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union, the new president of the European 
Council will be elected by qualified majority voting and for a term of two and a half year. In 
Article 9 (B) paragraph 6, duties are defined of the president of the European Council one of 
which “(d) shall present a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the 
European Council.” Hence, the one more information instrument was added to the European 
Parliament domain with the biannual report of the European Council’s President.  
Besides these improvements, abolition of the pillar structure of the EU123 provided a new 
opportunity for the European Parliament to establish more cooperative inter-institutional 
relations in common foreign and security matters. Side-effects of the intergovernmental 
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nature of the external policies can be healed through collaboration of the different institutions 
of the EU in actual and day to day practices of related bodies.  
 
The Lisbon Treaty increased the number of policy areas in which the "ordinary legislative 
procedure" i.e the codecision where the Parliament becomes a co-legislator along with the 
Council which decided, with a qualified majority. This procedure has been extended to some 
forty fields, the most important of which relate to justice and home affairs. Unfortunately, 
foreign policy, defence, operational police cooperation areas remained outside of these 
reforms still requiring unanimity in the Council.124 Still other forty areas which the co-
decision procedure extended have important external effects in directly, therefore making the 
European Parliament an equal partner in effecting the EU’s relations.  
One of these policy areas which the Lisbon Treaty increased power of the European 
Parliament is the trade policy. The European Parliament is now a co-legislator with the 
Council on trade matters. The powers of the EP can be classified under three headings: (1) all 
basic EU trade legislation, (2) all trade agreements, (3) status of trade negotiations.125 EU 
legislation on trade matters such as anti-dumping, trade preferences has to pass through the 
European Parliament in ordinary legislative procedure before being adopted or amended by 
the Council. Secondly, to conclude an international trade agreement, European Parliament’s 
consent is required. It is not enough the Council to sign the agreement, but the parliament 
must give its consent in order to enter the agreement in force formally. Then, Council has to 
adopt a second decision on the conclusion of the agreement formally. And, during the 
negotiations the Commission must inform Council and Parliament about the process. While 
the Commission informs the Council through the Trade Policy Committee composed of 
Member State representatives, it informs the European Parliament through Committee on 
International Trade (INTA).126 Therefore, European Parliament has a powerful hand in 
shaping the common foreign and security policy through its competencies in international 
trade matters. Because the trade agreements with third countries are one of the most 
influential stick to enforce certain measures on the parties in question. Additionally, the 
Commission and the Council take the European Parliament’s position seriously in 
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international matters. For example, commenting on the EU-Central America Association 
Agreement, the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton stated, "I welcome the European 
Parliament’s consent to the EU-Central America Association Agreement. Based on common 
principles and objectives, such as democracy, human rights, and inclusive and sustainable 
development, the European Union and its Central American partners have reached a 
comprehensive agreement, which includes three complementary pillars, political dialogue, 
cooperation, and trade. Through it, we will achieve a stronger political dialogue and more 
effective cooperation on a wide range of issues at the regional level. These important 
instruments will give us the opportunity to better work together towards the development of a 
closer relationship and a deeper regional integration. In this sense, we hope to see our 
commitment to shared principles and objectives emerge stronger. I look forward to a swift 
ratification process and entry into force."127  
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3.5.   Concluding Remarks 
This chapter analyzed the institutional changes in the common foreign and security policy of 
the European Union, specifically those adopted since 1986 with Treaty revisions. Within this 
institutional structure, the European Parliament was first designed as a consultative assembly 
but then it turned out to be source of legitimacy for the policies of the Union. As the common 
foreign and security policy of the EU was moved to more supranational ground, role of the 
European Parliament in shaping it increased in time. It was first given the right to be 
informed with SEA. Later Maastricht Treaty expanded its competencies to the right to be 
consulted, ask questions and make recommendations. Amsterdam Treaty introduced some 
budgetary competencies which are later expanded by the Nice Treaty. Although the Nice 
Treaty introduced number of novelties in external relations of the EU, it did not increase the 
role of the EP in common foreign and security policy. Because what the Nice Treaty brought 
about the European security and defense policy as having military implications were designed 
as an intergovernmental sphere, excluding the participation of the Union bodies such as the 
European Parliament as much as possible. However, the Lisbon Treaty expanded the EP’s 
role in CFSP significantly by introducing the European External Action Service and the High 
Representative for the foreign affairs of the Union as the head of the EEAS and one of the 
Vice-Presidents of the Commission. Since the European Parliament was the authority to elect, 
approve or disapprove the President of the Commission and the whole College, this provides 
the EP with exerting influence over the CFSP by deciding who the High Representative will 
be. Moreover, EP expanded the use of its budgetary powers through the EEAS’ budget and 
the other expenditures which are charged to the Union budget. At last but not least, the 
Lisbon Treaty provided the European Parliament with significant competencies in trade 
policy by making it the co-legislator with the Council. Therefore, a new window of 
opportunity has opened for the EP to influence the CFSP through international trade 
agreements.  
As a last word, in due course, the European Parliament acquired significantly more power in 
shaping the EU’s foreign policy institutionally, procedurally, budgetary as well as lending 
elements of accountability, transparency and legitimacy. In the next chapter, the focus will be 
the classification of the current powers of the European Parliament in EU’s CFSP. 
 
 
 
48 
 
Chapter 4.  Classification of the European Parliament’s Powers in the CFSP 
The power of the European Parliament is a trustworthy yardstick for the progress of European 
integration.128 Since the focus of integration is concentrated on technical issues, as a political 
body European parliament remained as a second class institution within the European Union 
structures. Furthermore, regarding the common foreign and security policy, European 
Parliament’s power is more strained leaving this policy area mostly under the jurisdiction of 
national governments. Indeed, even the national parliaments also do not have so much say in 
foreign policy issues since the nature of the foreign policy is generally perceived as 
confidential and to be conducted by the executives. Despite all, regarding the common 
foreign security policy, the European Parliament has powers which can be classified as 
legislative powers, budgetary powers, supervisory powers and information powers. In this 
chapter, European Parliament’s competencies will be examined in the sense whether the EP 
can exercise these powers fully or not.  
4.1.  Legislative Powers 
The European Parliament, together with the Council, is the main legislative body of the 
European Union. The Commission is a quasi legislator as even though it initiates legislation, 
its main responsibility is execution and implementation. The role of the European Parliament 
has expended gradually over time.129 In beginning, the EP was limited by only ‘consultation 
procedure’. Under this procedure, the EP only gives non-binding opinions on legislative act 
to the Commission and the Commission is free to decide whether it will take the Parliament’s 
opinion into consideration or not. In 1986, Single European Act introduced the ‘assent 
procedure’ and ‘cooperation procedure’ giving more power to the EP. Assent procedure 
requires the European Council to obtain the assent of the European Parliament. However, the 
EP cannot make amendments on the legislative act in question, it may or may not give its 
assent. This procedure was applied to vital issues such as international agreements, 
enlargement decisions, structural and cohesion funds decisions etc.  ‘Cooperation procedure’ 
takes place in two readings. After the first reading of the European Commission’s proposal, 
the European Parliament issues an opinion including its amendments to the proposal. 
Hereupon the Council adopts its common position. The Parliament may approve, amend or 
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reject the common position in the second reading. What significant is that the Council act 
unanimously when adopting the bill that has been amended or rejected by the EP. 
Nevertheless, the final decision is still up to the Council and this procedure was applied to 
limited number of policy areas.  
In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty introduced the ‘co-decision procedure’, significantly 
enhancing the role of the EP in legislative process of the EU. In this procedure, the 
Parliament and the Council are in equal footing. In first, second or third readings, the 
Parliament and the Council seek to reach an agreement on proposed legislation. If they 
cannot bring a successful conclusion, a conciliation committee handles the proposal to find 
out a compromise. Conciliation committee consists of equal number of representatives from 
the Parliament and the Council. This committee produces a joint text and it voted in the 
Parliament by absolute majority and in the Council by qualified majority (usually) to adopt it. 
The co-decision procedure is the fittest form of legislative procedure for democratic norms. 
Use of co-decision procedure in EU’s legislation increased over time by the subsequent 
Treaty amendments. 
Treaty of Lisbon aimed at simplifying the decision making of the EU in order to make it 
more effective and more intelligible. Furthermore, democratic standards of the EU were 
reformed by enhancing the democratic equality, representative and participatory democracy 
and transparency. Therefore, article 289 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU refers 
two types of legislative procedures: “ordinary legislative procedure” and “special legislative 
procedure”. Ordinary legislative procedure is same as the former co-decision procedure. It is 
the most proper legislative procedure for a parliamentary democracy since it requires the 
qualified majority voting as the voting rule, eliminating the possibility of blocking the 
Union’s proper functioning with a national veto.  Most importantly, it brings the European 
Parliament on an equal basis with the Council of the EU by making it a co-legislator. Also, 
Treaty of Lisbon extended the ordinary legislative procedures to new areas making the EU’s 
legislation more legitimate. Unfortunately, common foreign and security policy is not one of 
these policy areas.  
On the other hand, use of qualified majority voting was also extended in the Lisbon treaty in 
a decision making system in which the Council of the EU and the European Council are the 
sole legislators but the European parliament is not included in this domain. Although the 
unanimity remained as rule in taking common foreign and security decisions, Article 31(2) 
50 
 
TEU introduced four exceptions to this principle by stating that the Council shall adopt by a 
qualified majority:  
- “when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a 
decision of the European Council relating to the Union's strategic interests and 
objectives, as referred to in Article 22(1), 
 
- when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position, on a proposal which 
theHigh Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has 
presented following a specific request from the European Council, made on its own 
initiative or that of the High Representative, 
 
- when adopting any decision implementing a decision defining a Union action or 
position, 
 
- when appointing a special representative in accordance with Article 33.” 
 
 
Nevertheless, According to the Article 31(4) TEU for the decision having military and 
defence implications, qualified majority voting shall not be applied. Because the member 
states do not want to give up control over their own security and defense policies.  
Article 36 of the TEU opens a way for the EP to give a non-binding opinion to the Council on 
main aspects of the CFSP: “The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy shall regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the 
basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and 
defence policy and inform it of how those policies evolve. He shall ensure that the views of 
the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration.” Although no additional formula 
is offered to control whether the consideration of the EP is taken by the Council in what level, 
this treaty provision is an important step for the inclusion of the EP into the security policy of 
the EU whereas previously the High representative did not need to inform the EP at all. 
As it is mentioned previously, the European Parliament has a significant role in concluding 
international agreements since it requires the approval of the EP. Thus, the EP acquired an 
effective way to affect the foreign Policy of the EU. The European Commission must consult 
the European Parliament before and during the negotiations for international agreements. In 
order to enter into force, a majority of the MEPs must ratify the international agreements. 
This increased the significance of parliamentary committee procedures, party groups, policy 
experts, and especially the rapporteurs.  
Therefore, it is not wrong to say that the legislative power of the European Parliament in 
common foreign and security policy does not exist in legal term but the EP does have power 
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to influence the CFSP decisions indirectly such as the budgetary power and its role in 
concluding international agreements. That is because of the very nature of decision making in 
the EU that is supranational and intergovernmental at the same time, as foreign and security 
policy is desired to remain largely intergovernmental by the member states, the EP’s role as a 
full-fledge co-legislator is almost non-exist in this area.  
 
4.2.  Budgetary Powers 
As budgetary issues were always a source of contention in the EU, the EP’s budgetary 
powers evolved over time. On 21 April 1970, when the Council decided to create the Union’s 
own resources to cover all expenditures of the EU, the European Parliament came to a turning 
point in terms of attaining vital competences in budgetary affairs of the EU.130 Today, the 
European Parliament shall jointly with the Council exercise legislative and budgetary 
functions. (Article 14 TEU) Although the legislative functions of the EP were precluded in 
common foreign and security policy area, it still exercises its budgetary functions in CFSP 
matters. It is useful to first look at how the EP takes part in budgetary process. 
 
Article 223 to 234 and 314 TFEU put how the budget of the EU is formed and the Euroepan 
Parliament participates. Each institution of the EU with the exception of the Central Bank 
delivers their estimated expenditure for the following financial year to the Commission. The 
Commission consolidated these estimated expenditures into a draft budget and submits it to 
the European Parliament and the Council until 1 September of the year preceding that in 
which the budget is to be implemented. After the Council adopts its position on the draft 
budget, forwards it to the European Parliament with the full reasons which led it to adopt in 
this way until 1 October of the preceding year. Within forty two days, if the European 
Parliament (a) approves the position of the Council, or (b) does not take a decision, the 
budget is to be adopted. If the EP amends the draft budget by a majority of its members, the 
amended budget is to be forwarded to the Commission and to the Council. If the Council 
does not adopt all the amendments the EP made within ten days, a Conciliation Committee 
convenes. The Conciliation Committee consists of equal numbers of the EP members and the 
members of the Council or their representatives and is tasked with reaching an agreement on 
a joint text on the basis of the positions of the EP and the Council by a qualified majority 
voting within the twenty one days. Within the period of fourteen days the European 
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Parliament and the Council are expected to approve or the reject the joint text or they may 
fail to take a decision. If both of them approve or one of the institutions approves the joint 
text while the other fails to take a decision, the budget is deemed to be adopted in accordance 
with the joint text. A new draft budget is to be submitted to Commission if both of the 
institutions reject or one of the institutions rejects the joint texts while the other fails to take a 
decision, or if the European Parliament rejects the joint text whereas the Council approves. 
According to the Article 314 TFEU (1-10) if the European Parliament approves the joint text 
whilst the Council rejects it, the European Parliament may decide to confirm all or some of 
the amendments made by the Council or rejects the amendments and adopt the budget 
definitely with the position agreed in the Conciliation Committee on the budget heading 
which is the subject of the amendment.  
Contrary to the other weak powers of the EP in CFSP, financing of the CFSP enables 
significant parliamentary participation.131 The expenditures which are charged to the Union 
budget have to be subject to the budgetary procedure defined above in which the European 
Parliament has the last word. According to Article 41 of the TEU, administrative 
expenditures of the CFSP shall be charged to the Union budget. Also second paragraph of the 
same article reads that the operational expenditures also shall be charged to the union budget 
but with the exception of expenditures arising from operations having military or defence 
implications. Indeed, paragraph 3 opens a window to finance also some parts of common 
security and defence operations by a council decision establishing specific procedures for 
guaranteeing rapid access to appropriations in the Union budget for urgent financing of 
initiatives in the framework of common foreign and security policy. After consulting the 
European Parliament, it is particularly stated that such arrangement can be done for 
preparatory activities for the tasks referred in Article 42 (1) (peace-keeping, conflict 
prevention and strengthening international security) and Article 43 (joint disarmament 
operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict 
prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation). For the operations which cannot be charged to 
the Union budget under the article 42 and 43(1), ‘start-up funds’ will be created by the 
contributions of the Member States in accordance with their gross national product. 
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The new post of High Representative introduced in the Lisbon Treaty is also bound to the 
European parliament financially, since it is a double hated position as being also a vice 
president of the Commission whose budget is approved by the parliament. Therefore, 
expenditures of the High representative are under the control of the EP directly. Likewise, 
another new institution introduced by the treaty of Lisbon is the European External Action 
service’s expenditures are subjected to the EP’s approval. Actions of the EEAS are closely 
related with the EP because without proper financing, it cannot perform its functions.  For 
example, in 2010, during the budgetary discussions, EU Budget Commissioner Janusz 
Lewandowski voiced the concerns relating to whether the EEAS would get the fund in need 
of by stating that "The commission is very concerned about the potential failure. Our message 
is very clear: We need to agree."132 This show how the EP has a bargaining power on the 
CFSP matters via the budgetary affairs of the EEAS, since its staff appointments, funding of 
projects and all other actions are planned in accordance with its financial potential. Eminent 
actors of the EP also involve closely to the issue, i.e. president of the European parliament 
Jerzy Buzek expressed his position by saying that "So that by the beginning of 2011 all EU 
projects and policies will be fully operational. A non-decision will be very costly."133 Thus, 
the members of the European Parliament have an opportunity to reflect their ideas on issues 
in question or criticize the policies implemented. For instance, UK Conservative Party MEP 
Timothy Kirkhope, Justice and Home Affairs spokesman of his party approach to issue more 
positively offering a solution and warning about the negative consequences in the case of a 
non-solution by stating that "On balance it is better to just get the budget sorted. This delay 
affects important matters, including the EEAS, farm payments and various EU grants."134 On 
the other hand another MEP from UK Independence Party Marta Andreasen criticized Union 
budgetary policy decision stating that "The EU makes spending promises based on money 
they would like rather than money they have. The EEAS is a classic case in point".135 Thus, 
through its ability to control and supervise budgetary matters, the EP acquired some element 
of involvement in the EU’s foreign and security policies. 
Ongoing debates on the Multi-annual Financial Framework 2014-2020 between the European 
Parliament and the member states is also another remarkable example presenting the power 
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of the in influencing the external policies of the EU in the sense that if the EP accepts 
commission’s proposal to allocate €70 billion to the EU external activities, number of new 
elements will be introduced to the EU’s external affairs, such as a single integrated pre-
accession instrument, a new type of European Neighborhood Instrument and a new pan-
African Instrument.136 
Also the expenditures of the EEAS are not stable; it is increasing day by day as well getting 
bigger shares each year in accordance with the years before. This grow in the EEAS budget 
receives serious criticism from the member states. Also the High Representative Catherine 
Ashton struggles with the Member states’ resistance both to the EU’s existence at abroad and 
to the EU’s external policies in action. In 2011, Arab Spring requires the EEAS to take more 
actions in the regions in question. In order to keep up with the rapidly changing international 
environment, EEAS had to open new offices in different part of the world, such as the one in 
Benghazi which was activated in 2011. Therefore, new initiatives, investments and staff 
recruitments necessitate more financial resources which are charged to the Union budget. A 
fierce criticism supervened from British junior minister David Lidington made a statement to 
the press stating that “Ashton's proposal to boost EEAS spending by almost €30 million to 
€490 million next year will not fly. I think that they have got to get real as far as the budget is 
concerned. This 5.8 percent that they're asking for is somewhat ludicrous."137He also noted 
that EU ambassadors located in 136 foreign delegations should not attempt to speak for 
member states relying on their new powers under the Lisbon Treaty and he added "There is 
pressure from parts of the EU machine to push competence. We push back. If it's 
overambitious, it actually can achieve a lot less."138Lady Ashton replied the attacks coming 
from the UK on EU foreign relations seeking too much money and too much power for the 
EEAS, stating that the extra projects in order to increase the EU presence in post-
revolutionary Egypt and Tunisia need extra money.139Despite the severe criticism coming 
from the number of the EU member states, European External Action Service has been trying 
to ensure its presence within the institutional set up of the Union by widening itself into the 
various regions of the world. This new dynamism also provides an opportunity for the 
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European Parliament to procure its power in the common foreign and security policy through 
its budgetary competencies in which the EEAS also is under.  
Besides the abovementioned treaty provisions, over the years, the European Parliament has 
developed “a practice of intensive inter-institutional contacts and interactions resulting in a 
growing capacity to obtain information on current issues of CFSP” through concluding inter-
institutional agreements with the Council and the Commission.140 On 17 May 2006, an Inter-
institutional Agreement was signed between the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission on the budgetary discipline and sound financial management aimed “to 
implement budgetary discipline and to improve the functioning of the annual budgetary 
procedure and cooperation between the institutions on budgetary matters as well as to ensure 
sound financial management.”141 This agreement has become binding on all of the 
institutions of the Union covers the financial framework for 2007-2013. Part G (Article 42 
and 43) of this Inter-institutional Agreement is devoted to the financing of the common 
foreign and security policy and the budgetary cooperation among the parliament, council and 
the commission in this area. In article 42 of IIA, an agreement on the amount of the operating 
expenditure which is charged to the Community budget and on the distribution of this amount 
between the articles of the CFSP142 is aimed to be concluded among the EU institutions (the 
parliament, the council and the commission). If they cannot reach an agreement, the budget is 
deemed to be adopted in the amount of the previous year’s budget or the amount proposed in 
the preliminary draft budget, depending upon whichever is lower. 
 
In the second paragraph of the Article 42 of the Inter-institutional Agreement, it is stated that 
if the amount of CFSP budget chapter during the financial year remains insufficient to cover 
the necessary expenses, the European Parliament and the Council will seek a solution as a 
matter of urgency, on a proposal from the Commission. This statement represents that even in 
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the case of urgency; it is not possible to take an action concerning the budget without getting 
the approval of the EP.  
 
In Article 43(1) of the Inter-institutional Agreement, the Council Presidency is called to 
consult the European Parliament prior to annual report of the Council on the main aspects and 
the basic choices of the CFSP, including the financial implications for the general budget of 
the European Union. Furthermore, the Council Presidency is assigned to keep the European 
Parliament informed by holding joint consultation meetings at least five times a year. The 
increased communications between these two institutions increase the EP’s involvement on 
foreign and security policy, a realm traditionally reserved for member states. Also, whenever 
the Council adopts a decision in the field of the CFSP entailing expenditure, the Council will 
immediately, and in any event no later than five working days following the final decision, 
send the European Parliament an estimate of the costs envisaged (‘financial statement’), in 
particular those regarding time-frame, staff employed, use of premises and other 
infrastructure, transport facilities, training requirements and security arrangements. 
 
As a result, one can argue that the European Parliament has the capacity to influence the 
common foreign and security policy making effectively through participating to the 
budgetary process of the EU as an equal partner with the Council. The treaty provisions lead 
to initiation of this process and the further institutional arrangements enhanced the EP’s 
position vis-à-vis other institutions. Therefore, EP’s role in the budgetary process which 
includes financing the most of the CFSP projects enabled to have more democratic and 
accountable foreign policy of the Union.  
 
 
4.3.  Supervisory Powers 
The European Parliament exercises its supervisory powers over the European Commission 
and the Council on the basis of the Rules of Procedure of the EP. In general term, supervisory 
powers of the EP includes “monitoring the management of EU policies, conducting 
investigations, inquiries, and public hearings, and submitting oral or written questions to the 
Commission and the Council.”143 Since the CFSP decisions are not under the jurisdiction of 
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the ECJ, parliamentary supervision of the CFSP enables a degree of political scrutiny over 
this policy area through a number of instruments. 
The European Parliament has a very limited role in monitoring the actions taken within the 
framework of common foreign and security policy since the this policy area is perceived as in 
the domaine reserve of the member states. For this reason CFSP actions kept away from the 
supervision of the supranational institutions of the Union such as the European Parliament.  
However, the European Parliament has a few scrutiny powers arising from its role in 
appointment of the president of the commission and other commissioners. In addition to that 
Article 232 of the TFEU authorized the parliament to create its own rules of procedure which 
forms another basis for its scrutiny power of the parliament. The EP’s rules of procedure 
provide EP to set up certain committees to deal with the issues under their specialization. 
AFET is the one concerning the Foreign Affairs.  
The vote of approval of the EP is required for newly nominated Commission president and 
the whole college to take the office. Article 17 (7) TEU clarifies how the President of the 
Commission and his College of Commissioners come into office:  
“Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held the 
appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose 
to the European Parliament a candidate for President of the Commission. This candidate shall 
be elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its component members. If he does 
not obtain the required majority, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall 
within one month propose a new candidate who shall be elected by the European Parliament 
following the same procedure. The Council, by common accord with the President-elect, 
shall adopt the list of the other persons whom it proposes for appointment as members of the 
Commission. [...] The President, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy and the other members of the Commission shall be subject as a body to a 
vote of consent by the European Parliament. On the basis of this consent the Commission 
shall be appointed by the European Council, acting by a qualified majority.” 
As it is seen in Article 17 (7), the commission and the college cannot become functional 
unless they are elected in the Parliament by a majority of its members. Since the high 
representative of the EU for foreign affairs which is a double-hated position serving as one of 
the vice-presidents of the Commission is also in need of getting the majority votes of the 
MEPs. These are significant steps expanding the role of the European Parliament as a control 
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and supervision mechanism. It brings to the European Parliament a wide space to maneuver 
in terms of shaping the common foreign and security policy through its control power over 
the personality who will run the CFSP.  However, it does not mean that the European 
parliament exercise its control limitless over the president of the commission and the college. 
The EP can accept, reject or dismiss the entire commission, not a single Commissioner. This 
deters EP to reject or dismiss the whole commission if it is dissatisfied with only some 
members of the Commission. In this sense, as it is mentioned in Article 17 (7), prior 
consultation of the Council to the Parliament concerning the President of the Commission 
and the members of the College matters the Parliament and the Council to meet on a common 
ground.  
In addition to this, the European Parliament may vote on ‘a motion of censure’ of the 
commission. (Article 234 TFEU) Since the European Commission, as a body, is responsible 
to the European Parliament, the commission has to win the confidence of the Parliament. If 
the EP carries such a motion, the members of the Commission have to resign as a body 
together with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
Hence, On the basis of Article 17 (7-8) TEU and the Article 234 TFEU the European 
Parliament has a remarkable level of parliamentary control over the institution which is ‘fully 
associated’ with the work carried out in CFSP.144 
Apart from the supervisory powers of the EP which are stemmed from the Treaty provisions 
of the TEU and TFEU, rules of procedure of the EP provides the parliament the opportunity 
to scrutinize the CFSP works indirectly. The rules of procedure of the EP regulate the internal 
arrangement of the European Parliament in order to make it work efficiently. Plenary, a large 
spectrum of committees, political groups, informal inter-groups, inter-parliamentary 
delegations carry out the daily works of the EP. Parliamentary committees function as 
elementary particles of an atom serving to make it move. “Committee on Foreign Affairs” 
(AFET) is responsible for conducting the union’s affairs relating to common foreign and 
security and the European security and defence policy. AFET is also assisted by a 
subcommittee on security and defence (SEDE). Within this scope, AFET manages the 
“relations with other EU institutions and bodies, the United Nations and other international 
organisations and interparliamentary assemblies for matters falling under its 
responsibility.”Besides, AFET aims at “strengthening of political relations with third 
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countries, particularly those in the immediate vicinity of the Union, by means of major 
cooperation and assistance programmes or international agreements such as association and 
partnership agreements.” Parliamentary affairs relating to enlargement, as being an integral 
component of the EU, are also conducted by the AFET by “opening, monitoring and 
concluding of negotiations concerning the accession of European States to the Union.”145 
AFET carries these duties through joint parliamentary committees and parliamentary 
cooperation committees. There eight joint parliamentary committees and five parliamentary 
cooperation committees under the umbrella of the European Parliament. For example, joint 
parliamentary committee between Turkey and the European Union is one of them. This JPC 
serves as a model parliament consisting of equal number of member of the EP and the 
members of the TGNA. Members of the both parliament meet at least twice in each year on 
general meeting format and bureau meetings are organized prior to these meetings. Seventy 
general meetings of Turkey – European Union Joint Parliamentary Committee have taken 
place until now. In each and every month, some of the MPs visit the MPs in other parliament. 
During these meetings and visits, members of the European Parliament monitor whether 
Turkey recorded progress on the issues concerning her accession to the EU. These issues 
generally consist of political matters which are known as the Copenhagen criteria. Although 
the decisions, conclusions, reports and resolutions which are produced during these meetings 
are not binding on the parties, they creates significant political pressure on the candidate 
country in the direction of adjusting its legislation in accordance with the acquis 
communitaire of the Union. In this sense, direct involvement of the MEPs to the relations 
with third countries enables them to possess a high degree of informal supervisory power 
upon the common foreign security policy of the Union. Also, a subcommittee on human 
rights assists the AFET issues concerning human rights such as protection of minorities and 
the promotion of democratic values in third countries. Interparliamentary delegations, ad hoc 
delegations and election observation missions carry out the work under the responsibility of 
this subcommittee. For this purpose, members from other committees and bodies with 
responsibilities in this field can be invited to attend the meetings.146 
Hence, the role of parliament in the appointment of the president of the commission and the 
entire college ensures ‘formal’ supervisory power of the EP on common foreign and security 
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policy whereas the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) along with its sub-divisions 
enabled the EP to exercise additional ‘informal’ supervisory powers despite the fact they are 
not binding on the parties but produce significant political pressure on the sides.   
On the other hand, the issue of parliamentary supervision of the EU mission abroad having 
military and defence implications remains almost out of the European Parliament’s reach. A 
sub-committee on security and defence under the jurisdiction of the AFET serves for the 
parliamentary aspect of the defense related matters. It provides a forum for the exchange of 
views, presentation of MEP’s reports on the matters relating to defence. Nevertheless, as it 
has been the case for even at national level, parliamentary oversight of the defense policies 
and actions are mostly hindered by executives. Despite the fact that the members of the 
European Parliament brought up to issue to agenda on several reports147 and working 
groups148, defence matters remains as a difficult field for democratic control due to its 
confidential nature conflicting with the principles of transparency and accountability.149 
Although some scholar suggests that the EP has limited supervisory powers in scrutinizing 
the CFSP,150 it should be underlined that the supervisory powers of the EP significantly 
increased through appointment procedure of the President of the Commission and the entire 
College of the Commissioners. Moreover, internal arrangement of the Parliament also 
provides the EP with important supervision opportunities through working of the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs (AFET) along with its sub-divisions.  
4.4.   Information Powers 
As the European Union’s presence increased all over the world with its vast staff in 
delegations and the military and civilian missions on various regions require more reliable 
and regular flow of information. Democratic accountability and transparency become matter 
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of concern in terms of parliamentary access to information on common foreign and security 
policy. Hence the treaties of the European Union and Inter-institutional agreements granted 
the European parliament to access to certain kind of information as a source power to the EP. 
The two and a half year term-president of the European Council introduced by the Lisbon 
treaty (Article 15(4) TEU) is entitled for the external representation of the Union on issues 
concerning its common foreign and security policy (Article 15(6) TEU) and he is also liable 
to present a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the European 
Council (Article 15(6(d)) TEU). Composition of the issues represented in the report of the 
president of the European council varies in accordance with the issues at stake at that time. 
However, common foreign and security matters always take place during discussions in 
European council meetings and also reflected in the report of the president of the European 
council to the European parliament. Depending on the international atmosphere and the 
agenda of the European Union, concentration of the CFSP matters during the discussions and 
in the reports may change time to time. For example, in September 2010 European Council 
conclusion document is only about the EU’s external policies with the exception of half page 
long information about the task force on economic governance.151This document put that “the 
European Council discussed how to give new momentum to the Union's external relations, 
taking full advantage of the opportunities provided by the Lisbon Treaty. It agreed on the 
need for Europe to promote its interests and values more assertively and in a spirit of 
reciprocity and mutual benefit.”152 With these statements, the European Council, as a purely 
intergovernmental body, recognizes the benefits of a common European foreign and security 
policy and reports it to the parliament along with its concrete measures to enhance the 
effectiveness of the Union external policy. Whereas the 2010 September European Council 
meeting allocates almost all chapters on common foreign and security policy, latest  13-14 
December 2012 European Council refers the points touched in the conclusions of December 
2008 and  September 2010 European Councils; and addresses the situation in Syria as a 
matter of priority.153 
The High Representative, who holds a triple hatted position being vice president of the 
commission, leading the European external action service and also chairing the Foreign 
Affairs Council, is a more “regular visitor to European Parliament where he/she “regularly 
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consults” the European parliament on the main aspects and basic choices of CFSP and 
CSDP “…and inform it of how those policies evolve”.154 Article 21 of Treaty on European 
Union also puts that “Special representatives may be involved in briefing the European 
Parliament.” High Representative holds debates on progress in implementing the common 
foreign and security policy including the common security and defence policy at least twice 
a year. Apart from these debates which are in plenary format, high representative and the 
special representatives come before the European parliament’s other respective bodies such 
as AFET (Committee on Foreign Affairs), SEDE (Sub-committee on Security and 
Defence), DROI (sub-committee on Human Rights), DEVE (Committee on Development), 
AFCO (Committee on Constitutional Affairs) and ad hoc Special Committees. During these 
discussions, the European Parliament asks questions of the Council or makes 
recommendations to it and to the High Representative. This ensures fruitful discussion 
forum and exchange of information in which the European Parliament can get at the first 
hand. 
One of the main information sources of the European Parliament is the annual report 
prepared by the Council on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign 
and security policy. The council is liable to prepare this report on basis of the Inter-
institutional Agreement of 17 May 2006 and the Article 21 of the TEU. Prior to the 
presentation of this report, Presidency of the Council shall consult to the European 
Parliament on matters concerning the CFSP within the time framework scheduled in Article 
21 TEU.  After the annual report published by the Council, it is passed on to the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs (AFET) of the Parliament. AFET prepares a report on the annual report 
of the Council. After a debate on this AFET report in the Plenary, a resolution is adopted. In 
addition to the resolution, the President of the Council and the High Representative 
[Commissioner on External Relations] usually make statements on the report, underlining 
important points in the report and certain issues in CFSP.155 
Another field where the European Parliament possesses the right of information is enhanced 
cooperation.156Enhanced cooperation can be established on the basis of Article 20 of TEU 
among the member states of the Union ‘as a last resort’. Article 86(1) of the TFEU lays 
down the procedure of enhanced cooperation: “… if at least nine Member States wish to 
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establish enhanced cooperation on the basis of the draft regulation concerned, they shall 
notify the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission accordingly.” Also in a 
separate chapter of the treaty on functioning of the European Union, title 3 is devoted the 
rules of the implementation of enhanced cooperation. Article 328 and 329 puts that the 
European Parliament has to be informed regularly regarding the developments in enhanced 
cooperation either by the Commission or the High representative depending on the 
situation. If the member states wish to establish enhanced cooperation between themselves 
within the framework of the common foreign and security policy, they need to forward it to 
the Council, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy,the Commission and to the European Parliament. High Representative and the 
Commission separately give opinion on whether the enhanced cooperation proposed is 
consistent with the Union’s common foreign and security policy and consistent with other 
Union policies.157 As it can be seen from the treaty provision, the European Parliament has 
no power other information concerning the enhanced cooperation. While the Council and 
the High Representative are entitled to ‘fully inform’ the European Parliament on the 
implementation and developments of the enhanced cooperation, there is no binding 
commitment for the Council to take the Parliament’s position into account or to follow its 
views.158 
European Parliament’s access to information on European Security and defence policy is 
much more limited than the common foreign and security policy due to the sensitive nature of 
military matters. Since member states perceives the military and civilian forces as their own 
sovereign issues even if they see benefit in cooperating in certain cases, they created separate 
mechanism under which they can act together without the scrutiny of the supranational 
bodies such as the European Parliament. Nevertheless, since the EU initiated its first military 
mission in 2003 (operation Concordia in the FYROM), number of the military and civilian 
ESDP missions abroad increased steadily. European Union has been engaging not only in 
Europe but also in other parts of the world such as Caucasus, Middle East, Southeast Asia 
and sub-Saharan Africa.159“The increasing importance and number of ESDP missions has 
provoked strong debate regarding the complex nature of EU crisis management decision-
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making and resulting implications for parliamentary accountability.”160Since what the 
European Parliament expected to get from the ESDP structures in terms of information and 
regular consultation is far from what the ESDP structures provided to the European 
Parliament, relations between the Parliament and the Council were tensed until the 
conclusion of the Inter-Institutional Agreement (IIA) in 2006161 decreasing “the gap between 
the demand and supply of information to the Parliament.”162 Nevertheless another Inter-
institutional Agreement of 20 November 2002163 made a categorization of the information 
concerning security and defence matters by classifying them as “TRÈS SECRET/TOP 
SECRET, SECRET or CONFIDENTIEL, whatever its origin, medium or state of completion, 
held by the Council in the field of security and defence policy and the handling of documents 
so classified.”164 As a result of this IIA, some of the Members of the European Parliament 
may access ‘sensitive information’ classified by the Council according to the procedure laid 
down in the agreement. In the context of the agreement, Presidency of the Council or the 
Secretary-General/High Representative may convey information on developments in 
European security and defence policy, including sensitive information, to the President of the 
European Parliament or the Chairman of the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy committee upon the request of 
them.165 Nevertheless, TOP SECRET information is excluded from this scope and it is put 
that these documents and information is prohibited to publish or forwarded to any other 
address. 166 
                                                          
160Ibid. 
161‘Inter-institutional Agreement between the EuropeanParliament, the Council and the 
Commission on budgetary discipline and sound financial management’, Official Journal C 
139/01, 14 June 2006. 
162Giovanni Grevi (2009). “EuropeanParliament, European Security and defence Policy, the 
first ten years (1999-2009)”. Edited by Giovanni Grevi, DamienHelly, Daniel Keohane. 
European union institute for security studies. p.51 
163‘Inter-institutional Agreement of 20 November 2002 between the European Parliament and 
the Council concerning access by the European Parliament to sensitive information of the 
Council in the field of security and defence policy’, Official Journal C 298/1, 30 November 
2002. The Chair of the AFET also chairs a special committee of five who can request and 
receive oral briefings by the Presidency or the SG/HR on sensitive issues and can consult 
secret documents within the premises of the Council, in so far as this is necessary for the 
exercise of the EP’s attributions concerning ESDP. 
164Ibid. Scope, 1.1 
165Arrangements for access to and handling of sensitive information, point 3., retrieved from 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2002:298:0001:0003:EN:PDF  
166 Point 3.3 
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As a conclusion, the European Parliament has remarkable information power on common 
foreign and security issues thanks to the new posts (such as High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs, Permanent President of the Council) and new institutions introduced with 
the Lisbon Treaty. Even though the EP criticizes the Council from time to time not being 
informed the EP on a regular base and detailed enough, in due course European Parliament’s 
views and consideration on CFSP appreciated by the council and reflected in the document 
produced by them. A member of the European Parliament states that “As far as the European 
Parliament's right to be informed and consulted is concerned, which is one of the most 
classical parliamentary rights, I can say, as a former member of a national parliament, that 
Mr. Solana and Mr. Patten account to the European Parliament and/ or the Foreign Affairs 
Committee much more often and more detailed than many of the national foreign or defence 
ministers actually do.”167 In this sense, it can be argued that the EP exercises its political 
influence through using its informative powers which are granted by both treaty provisions 
and several Inter-institutional Agreements.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
167Laschet (2002). p.4. 
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4.5.  Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, European Parliament’s competencies are examined classifying them as 
legislative powers, budgetary powers, supervisory powers and information powers. It is 
observed that although the Treaties do not give legislative power to the European Parliament 
in CFSP matters, the EP poses the power to influence the CFSP decisions indirectly such as 
its budgetary power and its role in concluding international agreements. On the other hand, 
budgetary powers of the EP enabled it to influence the CFSP, since the TFEU makes the EP 
co-legislator with the Council in adopting the EU’s budget. Hence, any expenditure of the 
CFSP which is charged to Union budget has to be approved by the Parliament. This makes 
the EP a key player in CFSP matter in question. Also, EP has supervisory powers on EU’s 
CFSP through appointment procedure of the President of the Commission and the College of 
Commissioners in which the High Representative for the foreign affairs of the European 
Union is the Vice-President of the Commission.  In addition to this, Parliamentary Committee 
on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and its sub-committees closely scrutinize the CFSP and ESDP 
matters preparing reports, giving opinions, issuing motion for resolutions. Lastly, information 
powers that the EP acquired firstly in Single European Act are important in the sense that 
creating communication channels between the High Representative, President of the Council 
and Members of the European Parliament. Since the High Representative and the President of 
the Council have to inform the European Parliament on a regular basis in the forms of 
parliamentary debates, question time, written or oral questions and regular annual reports on 
CFSP and ESDP, this creates enormous political influence over the Commission and the 
Council to take the EP’s position on CFSP matters into consideration. 
Therefore, the powers of the EP has diversified and become more functional in influencing 
the CFSP matters. This has secured to have a more legitimate European foreign and security 
policies which are also more accountable to the European citizens.  
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Chapter 5. Empirical Trends in Parliamentary Activities of the European Parliament 
Regarding the Common Foreign and Security and European Security and Defense 
Policy 
This chapter presents an empirical analysis of the extent to which the European Parliament 
has become an actor in the EU’s foreign and security policies.  To do so, the chapter analyses 
all the instruments that the Parliament has at its disposal ranging from debates to questions 
Accordingly, the chapter looks at the changes in the number of the specific parliamentary 
activities of the EP such as the number of the plenary debates, opinions, written and oral 
questions, amendments to documents on CFPS/ESDP, resolutions, decisions, working 
documents, and general texts adopted for information on CFSP and ESDP matters. 
Operationalization of Parliamentary Instruments in CFSP/ESDP Matters in the pre- 
and post-Lisbon Period 
In 2007, Lisbon Treaty introduced number of novelties. These novelties included the implicit 
promise of more institutional strength and more cooperation at the European level on the 
European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. As being perceived one of the most 
sovereign policy domains of the Member States, foreign policy matters is the most sensitive 
heading discussed during the Lisbon Treaty negotiations. For instance, John Major, former 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom stated in his speech , “[...]for each of us, there will be 
areas of foreign policy where national action is more appropriate. Hong Kong is an obvious 
example for the United Kingdom.”168 Therefore, it received “almost fifty percent of the 
amendments to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which are contained in the Reform 
Treaty, pertain to this field.”169 Despite the severe oppositions coming from some of the 
member states, Lisbon Treaty accomplished to include new provisions on the CFSP and 
ESDP. New instruments, positions and institutions introduced by the Lisbon Treaty affected 
the European Parliament’s involvement in CFSP in a positive manner by increasing its 
visibility in this field. In order to comprehend the effect of the Lisbon Treaty on the European 
                                                          
168 John Major (1994). speech at the William and Mary Lecture, given in Leiden at the 
University on 7th September, http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page1124.html 
169 Dr. Nicole Alecu de Flers (2008). “The Provisions on CFSP and CSDP in the Lisbon 
Reform Treaty: Stumbling Blocks or Milestones?”. Paper prepared for presentation at the 
conference “The Lisbon Reform Treaty: Internal and External Implications”, The Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem, 13-14 July 2008 Panel: ESDP-CFSP – General Themes, p.1 
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Parliament’s activities on CFSP and ESDP, it is significant to look at some empirical findings 
on output of its parliamentary activities.  
The presence of the European Union in all over the world has been increased especially with 
the recognition of the Union’s legal personality in the Lisbon Treaty enabling the EU to 
conclude international agreements and participate in international organizations, reinforcing 
its visibility and effectiveness in multilateral forums and bilateral relations. Today, EU has 
138 delegations in third countries and 8 delegations170 in international organizations 
representing the EU abroad and operating in close coordination with Member States’ 
embassies.171 Adopting such a dynamic profile in external relations, the European Union 
needs to act in a more coherence and continuity at international level as it is stated in 
preamble of the Treaty on European Union “desiring to enhance further the democratic and 
efficient functioning of the institutions so as to enable them better to carry out, within a single 
institutional framework, the tasks entrusted to them.”  
However, the treaty fails to define clearly how the institutional affairs are managed on CFSP 
and ESDP which are perceived as intergovernmental policies. While it gives some sort of soft 
competencies to the European Parliament in CFSP decision making, such as consultation and 
information, the EP amplified its participation in processes of the CFSP through informal 
arrangements such as long-established forms of co-operation and internal arrangements.172 
The Lisbon treaty carries these informal forms of cooperation on a more formal ground by 
assigning the High Representative, Special representatives and the permanent president of the 
Council of Europe to appear before the European Parliament regularly, inform and consult on 
particular CFSP issues. Within the EP, Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) is the main 
body functioning as a forum for democratic scrutiny of the CFSP. Two sub-committees of the 
AFET, which are the Sub-committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) and the Sub-
                                                          
170-Vienna: UN-OSCE-IAEA 
-Addis Ababa: AfricanUnion 
-Paris: OSCE-UNESCO 
-Strasbourg: COE 
-Rome: FAO 
-Geneva: UN/GEN 
-Geneva: WTO 
-New york: UN/NY 
171 Calculations based on the information on European Union external action service website. 
retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/repdel/edelhrm/index.cfm?fuseaction=crepdel.europa&l
ang=EN 
172 Wolfgang Wessel & Jürgen Mittag (2002).  p.87. 
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committee on Human Rights (DROI), organise hearings and discussions on the issues under 
their responsibilities. As a consequence of these debates, reports and resolutions are adopted. 
Thus these adopted text and the debates constitute a source for contributing common foreign 
and security policy of the Union on certain subjects.  
Along with the AFET, Committee on Budget, Committee on Development, Committee on 
International Trade, Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, and Committee on 
Constitutional Affairs works on the CFSP and ESDP matters pertaining to their scope. Other 
parliamentary committees may also involve in these workings in case of a specific expertise 
is needed. Moreover, temporary special committees may be established, whose aims and 
scope are determined by a decision taken by the European Parliament in a plenary session.  
The core parliamentary business is conducted in meetings of these parliamentary committees 
where the members of the parliaments discuss, exchange views and take votes on draft 
legislative documents and amendments, and often hold discussions with experts. Topics 
which are planned to rise in these meetings are included in the agendas which are published 
at least once a month. Therefore, agendas give useful traces showing which topics take place 
during the discussions in committee meetings. For example, 5 December 2011 draft agenda 
meeting of Sub-committee on Security and Defence includes a debate on “Weimar Triangle 
Plus”173 and CSDP among the representatives from Council, Commission and European 
External Action Service and the PSC Ambassadors of France (Jean-Louis Falconi), Germany 
(Johannes Haindl), Poland (Beata Pęksa-Krawiec), Italy (Luca Giansanti) and Spain (Carlos 
Fernández-Arias). Moreover, in another session exchange of views took place on the 
development of military capabilitiesamong the Executive Director of the European Defence 
Agency (Claude-France Arnould) and the Genaral Commander of NATO Allied Command 
Transformation (Stéphane Abrial). Besides these, the same agenda includes a presentation by 
Fabio Della Piazza, Chair of COARM, on the 13th Annual Report according to Article 8(2) 
of Council common position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of 
exports of military technology and equipment.  
                                                          
173Weimar Triangle Plus is a trilateral security cooperation group established between Poland, 
France and Germany. Lang and Schwarzer claim that this cooperation may provide the 
European Union needed military capacities such as leadership, consensus building, and 
strategic guidance. See Kai-Olaf LANG and Daniela Schwarzer, Consolidating the Weimar 
Triangle, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security 
Affairs, October 2011, Berlin, pp.1-8 See also Marcel Dickow / Hilmar Linnenkamp /Jean-
Pierre Maulny / Marcin Terlikowski, Weimar Defence Cooperation –Projects to Respond to 
the European Imperative, The Polish Institute for International Affairs, Berlin, Novermber 
2011, FG 03 WP 06, pp.1-11 
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Table 1. Involvement of CFSP matters in Committee Agendas 
 
Table 2. Involvement of ESDP matters in Committee Agendas 
 
 When the numbers of the committee agendas including CFSP and ESDP items are 
compared, it is seen that more CFSP/ESDP items are included in agendas of post-Lisbon 
period vis-à-vis pre-Lisbon period. This shows that after the conclusion of the Lisbon Treaty 
the European parliament have had more chance to engage with CFSP issues incorporating 
them into the parliamentary instruments.  
 
5.1.  Opinions 
Opinions are one of the parliamentary instruments, reflecting the perspective of a 
parliamentary committee on a certain document. In the Rules of Procedure of the European 
Parliament, Rule 49 puts how a committee may give its opinion at on another committee’s 
request or on its own initiative. The committee has to give its opinion within a time limit laid 
down in the rules of procedures and what important is that the responsible committee cannot 
reach its final conclusion before this time limit expired. Opinions include either suggestions 
or amendment on the document in question, depending on whether it has a legislative nature 
or not. In the case of documents of a legislative nature, opinion shall consist of amendments 
to text referred with short justifications. If it does not have a legislative nature the rapporteur 
                                                          
174Committee on ForeignAffairs 
175Sub-Committee on Security andDefence 
176Sub-committee on Human Rights 
177 Temporary Committee on Policy Challenges and Budgetary Means of the Enlarged Union 2007-2013 
178Committee on Budget 
179Committee on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy 
 31.12.2001-15.06.2007 15.06.2007-31.12.2012 
AFET174 11 15 
SEDE175 1 4 
DROI176 1 - 
FINP 177 1 - 
BUDG178 1 5 
TOTAL 15 24 
 31.12.2001-15.06.2007 15.06.2007-31.12.2012 
SEDE 14 18 
DROI  2 2 
ITRE179 - 1 
TOTAL 16 21 
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of the opinion includes suggestions in the opinion document. After the opinion submitted to 
the committee responsible, these suggestions or amendments are put to the vote. If the 
opinion decided to be adopted, it shall be annexed to the report of the committee responsible. 
For instance, European Commission released an “Energy Roadmap 2050” and forwarded it to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of Regions for information as a communication document.180 When the 
Parliament received this document put it into process as being a non-legislative act and 
subjected to the own-initiative procedure.181 The parliament authorized the Committee for 
Industry, Research and Energy as the committee responsible and the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs (AFET) as the committee for opinion along with other three committees.182 Upon the 
opinion request from the committee responsible, AFET appointed a Rapporteur183 in order to 
draw up a report indicating the points of the Commission document ‘Energy Roadmap 2050’, 
in which the Parliament weighs importance and suggests or demands some changes on 
them.184 It is the moment for AFET to exert influence over the common foreign and security 
policy through making suggestions or demanding amendments on the Commission’s 
Roadmap from a parliamentarian point of view. Hence, it is important for the AFET to 
express its opinion on a CFSP/ESDP matter in the sense that offering a democratic and 
transparent prudence to a technical Commission roadmap. After the Rapporteur drafted the 
opinion on the document, it is put the vote in committee. If it gets the majority in the AFET, 
it is forwarded to the committee responsible. Committee responsible drafts a report and 
annexes the opinion to it to be sent to the related department of the Commission. 
When the number of the opinions and the draft opinions concerning the CFSP and ESDP 
issues are compared, it is seen that after 2007 there is a drastic increase in number of the 
opinions and draft opinions concerning the CFSP while the ones concerning the ESDP 
remains same (Table 3 and Table 4). This shows that the Lisbon Treaty facilitated the 
European Parliament to be more active in common foreign and security policy by granting 
                                                          
180 The document can be accessible from European Commission’s website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy2020/roadmap/index_en.htm 
181 European Parliament, Rules of Procedure, AnnexXVIII: Procedure for granting 
authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports, legal basis TFEU 225, Rules of Procedure: 
Rule 42 and Rule 48 
182 For further information regarding the procedures in the European Parliament please visit: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2012/2103(INI)&l=
en#tab-0  
183 Rapporteur: Jacek Saryusz-Wolski 
184 Opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), 2012/2103(INI), 14.11.2012  
72 
 
more powers to it through making Council and the Commission obligatory to consult and 
inform the Parliament on certain CFSP issues.  
 
Table 3. Number of the Opinions regarding the CFSP and ESDP  
 31.12.2001-15.06.2007 15.06.2007-31.12.2012 
CFSP 20 51+1* 
ESDP 11 11 
TOTAL 31 63 
*1 Opinion in letter form totheCouncilproposalfor a CouncilRegulation(EC) No 881/2002 
imposingcertainspecificrestrictivemeasuresdirectedagainstcertainpersonsandentitiesassociated
withUsama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network andthe Taliban 
 
 
Table 4. Number of the Draft Opinions regarding the CFSP and ESDP  
 31.12.2001-15.06.2007 15.06.2007-31.12.2012 
CFSP 19 45 
ESDP 9 9 
TOTAL 28 54 
 
 
 
5.2.  Questions 
Parliamentary questions are a direct form of parliamentary supervision over other EU 
institutions and bodies. They are directed by Members of the European Parliament to other 
European Union Institutions and bodies. Chapter three of the Rules of Procedures of the 
European Parliament is devoted to the explanation of the Parliamentary questions. Three 
types of parliamentary questions are defined in Chapter three: (1) Questions for oral answer 
asked during plenary sittings, and included in the debates,185 (2) Questions for Question Time 
asked during the period spared for questions during plenary sittings186 and (3) Written 
questions requested with a written answer.187 Questions are addressed to the president of the 
European Parliament and the Conference of Presidents decides whether the question will be 
put in plenary session/question time or not.188 
                                                          
185 Rule 115 of the Rules of Procedures of the European Parliament 
186 Rule 116 of the Rules of Procedures of the European Parliament 
187 Rule 117 of the Rules of Procedures of the European Parliament 
188 Rules of Procedure, Rule 115(1), Rule 116(3), Rule 117(2) 
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Moreover the rule 116 (5) explicitly cites that specific question hours can be held with the 
“Vice President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs” 
in accordance with guidelines established by the Conference of Presidents. The fact that the 
current High representative Catherine Ashton appeared before the European Parliament about 
100 times189 for the debates and to answer the questions of the members of the European 
Parliament proves how this rule is a very well-functioning one in terms of bringing the 
number one player of the CFSP before parliament and render an account of actions taken 
under the umbrella of CFSP. 
A wide scope of questions are addressed to the Union’s institutions and bodies ranging from 
the restrictive measures applying on third countries to the attitudes of the High 
Representative on particular subjects during her meetings in different parts of the world.190 
Scope of the questions also varies in accordance with the international phenomena of the 
time, for instance, a remarkable degree of question in 2012 is about the EU’s sanctions on 
Syria and their implementation. 125 questions in 2012 and 89 questions in 2011 regarding 
turmoil in Syria were addressed to the Council.191 
Table 5. Questions with Answers concerning on CFSP/ESDP 
 31.12.2001-15.06.2007 15.06.2007-31.12.2012 
CFSP 121 337 
ESDP 20 61 
 
Table 6. Priority Written Questions on CFSP/ESDP 
 31.12.2001-15.06.2007 15.06.2007-31.12.2012 
CFSP 7 16 
ESDP 2 3 
 
Table 7. Written Questions on CFSP/ESDP 
 31.12.2001-15.06.2007  15.06.2007-31.12.2012 
CFSP 44 101 
ESDP 5 19 
                                                          
189 Videos can be accessible from: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-live/en/plenary/search-
by-speaker/results?speakerId=94301&start=60 
190 ALDE MEP Johannes Cornelis van Baalen E-008589/2012 Question for written answer  
to the Commission (Vice-President/High Representative) 27 September 2012 
191 Based on information on European Parliament website register of documents. Accessible 
from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegistreWeb/search/simple.htm?language=EN&fulltext=syria
&reference=&relName=&auteurSearch=&codeTypeDocuSearch=QECR&datepickerStart=&
datepickerEnd=  
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Table 8. Oral Questions on CFSP/ESDP 
 31.12.2001-15.06.2007  15.06.2007-31.12.2012 
CFSP 5 2 
ESDP 7 3 
 
When all types of the questions, except the oral questions, are concerned, it is seen that 
number of the questions regarding the CFSP and ESDP has increased sharply after 2007. It is 
a positive result of the Lisbon Treaty requiring the Vice President / High Representative, 
Special Representatives of the Union abroad and the permanent President of the Council of 
the European Union to appear before the European Parliament on a regular basis to answer 
the questions of the Members of the European Parliament and inform them on main aspects 
and basic choices in CFSP.  
 
5.3.  Resolutions 
Motions for resolutions192 are outputs of the Parliamentary activities of the European 
Parliament, in which Chapter 5 of the Rules of Procedures of the EP constitutes the legal 
basis of them. Any Member of the European parliament can table a motion for resolution on a 
matter falling within the sphere of activity of the European Union.193 There are three possible 
ways to issue a motion for resolution: (1) upon a statement by the Council, the Commission 
or the European Council194, (2) oral questions to the Council and the Commission195, and (3) 
in the case of winding up debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the 
rule of law.196 Joint Motions for Resolutions are the form a resolution which aims to replace 
the other motions for resolution given by other parliamentary groups on the same subject. A 
typical motion for resolution includes three parts consisting legal provisions, a concrete and 
detailed explanation of the act in question and the recommendations and remarks by the 
authors of the motion for resolution. In order to adopt a motion for resolution, a majority vote 
of the Members of the European Parliament is required in the final voting in the plenary.  
                                                          
192Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, Rule 120 
193 Ibid. 
194 Rules of Procedure of the EP, Rule 110(2) 
195 Ibid., Rule 115(5) 
196 Ibid., Rule 122(2) 
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Since the European Parliament is accepted as a representative of the democracy and the rule 
of law197 internationally, resolutions of the EP are effective parliamentary instruments in the 
sense that creating a political pressure upon its addressee. Hence, the European Parliament 
resolutions are capable of having repercussions among the international actors influencing 
their political preferences. Especially if a mutual interest between the parties is ensured 
through foreign policy tools of the EU such as Neighborhood policy or Stabilization and 
Accession Process, resolutions of the EP may exert more influence over the country in 
question. For example, European Parliament resolution of 13 December 2012 on situation in 
Ukraine criticizes the arrest and trial of the opposition leaders just before the parliamentary 
elections, urges Ukraine to comply with democratic norms and the rule of the law which are 
the core values of the European Union and calls Ukraine to establish closer cooperation with 
the institution of the EU.198 As a response to the EP Resolution Foreign Ministry of Ukraine 
made a statement revealing that they welcome the clear message of the European Parliament 
on the need for the EU to provide active support Ukraine in its reform efforts and it 
emphasizes that the Visa Facilitation Agreement signed in July 2012 will certainly be a 
powerful incentive and the best tool for the successful promotion of Ukraine on this way.199 
Foreign Ministry of Ukraine also adds that "Our further effective interaction with the 
European Union will play a key role in the context of further comprehensive reform 
implementation in Ukraine, particularly in the sphere of the supremacy of law. Therefore, we 
confirm our readiness for further cooperation with the mission of the EP's envoys Aleksander 
Kwasniewski and Pat Cox."200 This case shows that the EP Resolutions enables a high degree 
of influence on its addressee affecting its policy actions in direction of the EU’s desires.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
197Erik Oddvar Eriksen, John Erik Fossum (2002). “ Democracy through Strong Publics in 
the European Union?” Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. 40. Pp. 401- 424. 
198European Parliament resolution of 13 December 2012 on situation in Ukraine, 
P7_TA(2012)0507 
199For Um: Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry satisfied with European Parliament resolution, 14 
December 2012, accessible from: http://en.for-ua.com/news/2012/12/14/112857.html  
200Foreign Ministry: EP's resolution on Ukraine confirms EU's readiness to intensify 
cooperation with Kyiv, 14 December 2012, by Interfax, accessible from: 
http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/foreign-ministry-eps-resolution-on-ukraine-
confirms-eus-readiness-to-intensify-cooperation-with-kyiv-317653.html  
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Table 9. Involvement of CFSP and ESDP in Motions for Resolutions 
MOTIONS FOR 
RESOULTIONS FOR 
DECISION 
31.12.2001-15.06.2007  15.06.2007-31.12.2012 
CFSP 200 285 
ESDP 73 95 
 
Table 10. Involvement of CFSP and ESDP in Joint Motions for Resolutions 
 31.12.2001-15.06.2007  15.06.2007-31.12.2012 
CFSP 58 63 
ESDP 13 21 
TOTAL 71 84 
 
Observations on the number of the European Parliament Resolutions show that a smooth 
increase took place after the Lisbon Treaty was drawn in 2007(Table 9 and Table 10). Such 
increase signals that the European Parliament has become more engaged in international 
relations after the Lisbon Treaty due to the fact that the new treaty enables European 
Parliament to become a more effective institution within the EU and a more visible player in 
international relations.  
Another important yardstick showing incremental influence of the EP on CFSP matters is 
Council referrals to the European Parliament Resolutions in the Council documents which are 
main sources of the CFSP. In this context, it is important for the parliament that its position 
regarding the CFSP is taken into consideration201 by the Council which is the executor of the 
foreign policy. Empirical findings (Table 12 and Table 13) prove such tendency in Council’s 
approach to the European Parliament’s documents. Based on the information on the 
Council’s register of documents, three main headings (or subject matters) (PESC, COSDP, 
CSDP/PSDC) on CFSP are chosen to compare the number of referrals to the European 
Parliament’s resolutions before and after the Lisbon Treaty drafted. A modest rise in number 
of referrals is observed in the post-Lisbon period. On the other hand, number of the referrals 
to the Parliament’s resolutions in the annual reports of the Council on the main aspects and 
basic choices of CFSP sharply increased in the post-Lisbon era as well.  
 
 
 
                                                          
201 Article 36 TEU. 
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Table 11. Involvement of the European Parliament’s Resolutions regarding the CFSP 
matters within the Documents of the Council regarding CFSP matters 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12. Involvement of the European Parliament’s Resolutions regarding the CFSP 
matters within the Annual Report of the Council on the main aspects and basic choices 
of CFSP  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Besides the effective use of parliamentary tools in CFSP matters especially after the 
conclusion of the Lisbon Treaty, it can be said that the attractiveness of CFSP had also 
increased before the eyes of the Members of the European Parliament. Such claim can be put 
forward in view of increasing patterns of parliamentary works regarding common foreign and 
security policy for instance the growing number of debates taken place in plenary. (Table 12)  
 
 
 
                                                          
202 It is categorized with the COSDP in the document therefore it is not added to total amount 
to avoid the duplication.  
203In order to avoid duplication in total amount, it calculated as the sum of the documents 
related to only PESC, plus only COSDP plus PESC and COSDP together. ( (198+67)-
45=220) ; (276+75)-66=285 ) 
 31.12.2001-15.06.2007 15.06.2007-31.12.2012 
PESC 198 276 
COSDP 67 75 
CSDP/PSDC - 1202 
PESC+COSDP 45 66 
TOTAL203 220 257 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Number of the 
Referrals to the EP’s 
Resolutions or Other 
Activities 
2 6 6 8 25 91 65 56 73 
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Table 12. Involvement of CFSP/ESDP matters in Plenary 
*Total calculations include the total number of debates taken in the parliament on the issues 
concerning the CFSP and ESDP matters and are made by excluding the number of activities 
in year 2007 both from 2002-2006 period and 2008-2012 period. 
 
Also the increases in the numbers of amendments given by the MEPs to the draft opinions 
and draft reports on CFSP and ESDP (Table 13); and the increases in the number of adopted 
texts (Table 14) and the documents for information (Table 15) after the signature of the 
Lisbon Treaty prove that newly offered dynamic role for the EP in foreign relations of the 
Union attracts the attention of the MEPs strikingly.  
 
Table 13. Amendments given to draft opinions and draft reports regarding CFSP/ESDP 
 
Table 14. Adopted Text (Finalised edition) regarding CFSP/ESDP 
 31.12.2001-15.06.2007 15.06.2007-31.12.2012 
CFSP 74 86 
ESDP 20 37 
 
Table 15. Documents for Information on CFSP/ESDP matters 
 31.12.2001-15.06.2007 15.06.2007-31.12.2012 
CFSP 4 14 
ESDP 1 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
CFSP 8 21 39 67 63 75 79 68 82 73 74 
ESDP 4 6 4 5 7 6 11 6 6 2 6 
TOTAL     224*      407* 
 31.12.2001-15.06.2007  15.06.2007-31.12.2012 
Amendments to draft opinions on CFSP 15 38 
Amendments to draft opinions on 
ESDP 
9 16 
Amendments to draft reports on CFSP 20 62 
Amendments to draft opinions ESDP 15 28 
79 
 
5.4.  Concluding Remarks 
All things considered, it can be concluded that the European Parliament has become more 
capable of operationalizing the traditional parliamentary tools in CFSP/ESDP issues thanks to 
the reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. Either individual Member of the Parliaments or 
the political groups have become more active in terms of participating CFSP/ESDP making 
by drafting reports, issuing resolutions, offering suggestions and amendments on the Council 
and the Commission documents more than pre-Lisbon period. This provides a way to make 
CFSP/ESDP in a more democratic fashion by including parliamentary participation into the 
processes. Therefore the works carried out both in the committees (particularly in AFET) and 
Plenary have become more of an issue for the Council and the Commission pushing them to 
incorporate the European Parliament as a partner into CFSP and ESDP making.  
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CONCLUSION 
“We live in a modern world in which nation states are interdependent. In that modern world 
foreign policy is not divorced from domestic policy but a central part of any political 
programme.”204 
Robin Finlayson Cook, British Labor Party Politician Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, 1997 
European nation states are more interdependent to each other than any other nation states of 
the modern world are. Because they tied up so much knots to each other that it is now to risky 
to untie even one of them. Whereas almost whole domestic policies of the nation states of 
Europe integrated, it is inevitable foreign policies’ turn to come. When it was the foreign 
policies’ turn to be integrated in the European Union, the member states resisted heavily. 
Because delegating a part of their sovereignty in security and defense matter means them to 
shatter their national interest. Therefore, the member states endeavored to keep discussion on 
foreign policy matters as possible as far from the European level. When it was not possible, 
they preferred to deal with issues through intergovernmental mechanisms such as the Council 
because they do not want to lose national control over their foreign and security policy. 
Nevertheless, drastic changes in international system and increasing interdependency among 
European states required them to act together in a coherent manner. As attempts to establish a 
common European foreign policy had been perceived as discretionary policy choices till the 
early 1990s, new challenges emerged with the end of Cold War showed that a common 
response to external threats is a requirement.  
One of the findings of the thesis is that when the foreign policy problems began to be 
addressed at the European level, supranational institutions of the Union have had a voice 
gradually in this policy area despite heavy criticism coming from intergovernmental flanks. 
As the member states and the European citizens benefited from having common foreign 
policy, cooperation and integration spilled over whole sector including defense matters. 
European Parliament, as one of the supranational bodies of the EU, is the sample of this 
thesis, proving that CFSP has been acquiring more and more supranational elements through 
involvement of the EP in it. Another important finding is that the powers of the European 
Parliament increased significantly in EU’s common foreign and security policy after the 
                                                          
204 Kevin Theakston (2004). British Foreign Secretaries Since 1974. Routledge: London and 
New York. p.253 
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Lisbon Treaty was signed. Therefore, the slight increase in the number of the parliamentary 
activities involving the CFSP and ESDP matters after the Lisbon Treaty supports the 
argument offering the Lisbon Treaty increased the role of the European Parliament in EU’s 
CFSP. This serves as an example for Haas’ spill over concept which is on the phase of 
political spill over. 
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